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NOTES
BALANCING THE INTERESTS: A PRACTICAL
APPROACH TO RESTRICTIONS ON
EXPRESSIVE CONDUCT IN THE ANTI-
ABORTION PROTEST CONTEXT
In 1973, the United States Supreme Court in Roe v. Wade held
that the right to privacy, grounded in the concept of personal liberty
guaranteed by the Constitution, encompasses a woman's right to
decide whether to terminate her pregnancy.' Since then, abortion
opponents have formed hundreds of right-to-life organizations to
circumvent and reverse the decision. 2 Initially, the anti-abortionists
conducted peaceful protests, consisting of silent marches, sign carry-
ing, and prayer readings.' More recently, however, the protestors
have taken to "direct action" protest tactics, allegedly because of
their frustration with the inefficiency of the political system. 4 Anti-
abortion advocates have become increasingly vocal, confrontational
and violent. Protest tactics now include mass picketing, harassment
of patients, doctors, and staff at gynecological clinics and their
homes, trespassing, obstruction of clinics, and even arson and bomb-
ing. 5
The most militant of the anti-abortion protestors are the abor-
tion blockaders. These blockaders, who most commonly operate
under the auspices of "Operation Rescue," attempt to stop abortion
and end its legalization through demonstrations that they term
1 410 U.S. 113,152-53 (1973). Although the Supreme Court noted that the Constitution
does not explicitly mention any right of privacy, the Court recognized that a right of personal
privacy, or a guarantee of certain zones of privacy, does exist under the Constitution. Id. at
152. The Court stated that the roots of this right are contained in the first, fourth, fifth, and
ninth amendments; in the penumbras of the Bill of Rights; and in the concept of liberty
guaranteed by the first section of the fourteenth amendment. Id.
2 Note, Bering v. Share: Accommodating Abortion and the First Amendment, 38 CASE W. REs.
L. REV. 698, 699 (1988).
3 See id. at 701.
See id. at 701-02.
See id. at 702.
835
836	 BOSTON COLLEGE LAW REVIEW	 [Vol. 32:835
"rescues."6
 At a "rescue," the demonstrators intentionally trespass
on the gynecological clinic's premises for the purpose of blockading
the clinic's entrances and exits, thereby effectively closing the clinic.'
In response, women's rights advocates and gynecological clinics
across the nation have filed lawsuits seeking injunctions to prevent
such disruptive conduct. 8
 Faced with a growing number of these
lawsuits, particularly within the past two years, courts have been
forced to sculpt injunctions and consider regulations aimed at pre-
serving the right to an abortion without unduly infringing upon
the first amendment rights of the protestors. Courts have consis-
tently held that the first amendment does not afford anti-abortion
protestors the right to block off buildings as a means of expression. 9
In deciding cases involving expressive activity short of such block-
ades, however, these courts have differed as to the permissible scope
of such activity and in recognizing the interests implicated by such
conduct. 1 °
This note analyzes several recent cases dealing with abortion
protests, and critically examines both the restrictions on expressive
6 See National Org. for Women v. Operation Rescue, 726 F. Supp. 1483, 1488 (E.D. Va.
1989), aff'd, 914 F.2d 582, 584 (4th Cir. 1990), cert. granted sub nom., Bray v. Alexandria
Women's Health Clinic, 1 1 1 S. Ct. 1070 (1991).
Since the beginnings of Operation Rescue in 1987, the organization has given impetus
to a rescue movement that has continued to increase in magnitude despite the numerous
lawsuits, trials, fines, and instances of imprisonment. See Connors, Operation Rescue, AMERICA,
Apr. 29, 1989, at 400, 402. By 1989, there had been over 250 "rescues" across the United
States and Canada, with at least 30,000 U.S. and Canadian citizens risking arrest; of these,
20,000 had actually been arrested. Id. As John Cavanaugh-O'Keefe, who is identified by
some in the movement as "the father of rescue," said in 1989, "1 think there will be tremen-
dous numbers who will risk jail in the coming year." Wills, "Save the Babies", TIME, May 1,
1989, at 26, 28. He further asserted that "[t]his civil rights movement is larger, in terms of
sheer numbers of supporters and of those who have gone to jail all over the nation, than the
civil rights movement of the 60s. We're now ready to fill the jails." Id.
7
 National Org. for Women, 726 F. Supp. at 1488.
See Sherman, Courts Deal Blockaders Big Set Backs, NAT'L L.J., Nov. 13, 1989, at 30, col.
I.
9 See, e.g., Cox v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 536, 555 (1965); New York States Nat'l Org. for
Women v. Terry, 886 F.2d 1339, 1364 (2nd Cir. 1989); Bering v. Share, 106 Wash. 2d 212,
232, 721 P.2d 918, 930 (1986), cert. dismissed, 479 U.S. 1050 (1987). As the United States
Supreme Court stated in Cox, "[a] group of demonstrators could not insist upon the right to
cordon off a street, or entrance to a public or private building, and allow no one to pass who
did not agree to listen to their exhortations." 379 U.S. at 555.
1° See, e.g., Eanes v. State, 318 Md. 436, 440, 569 A.2d 604, 606 (1990) (upholding
statute prohibiting loud and unseemly noises); Thompson v. Police Dep't, 145 Misc. 2d 417,
418, 546 N.Y.S.2d 945, 946 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1989) (upholding injunction prohibiting protestors
from moving along sidewalk directly in front of clinic); O.B.G.Y.N. Ass'ns v. Birthright of
Brooklyn and Queens, Inc., 64 A.D.2d 894, 894, 407 N.Y.S.2d 903, 905 (N.Y. App. Div.
1978) (modifying injunction to prohibit picketing that disturbs or endangers the health or
safety of clinic patients).
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conduct that the courts have fashioned, and the governmental in-
terests on which the courts have based these restrictions. Section I
examines the evolution of rights to protest under the first amend-
ment as interpreted by the United States Supreme Court." This
section also discusses the right to abortion as defined by the Court,
and addresses the legal responses to the abortion conflict that have
attempted to preserve the rights of all parties involved. 12 Section II
considers the constitutional requirements placed upon restrictions
on expressive conduct and examines the courts' application of these
standards when considering regulations and fashioning injunctions
in the anti-abortion protest context." Section III scrutinizes the
application of these standards to three recent anti-abortion protest
cases and notes the ways in which courts are attempting to reconcile
the conflicting rights that these cases implicate." Section IV analyzes
the governmental interests on which courts have based their in-
junctions and concludes that those stated interests avoid addressing
the actual conflict of rights involved.' 5 Finally, this section proposes
that courts adopt a significant governmental interest, that of pro-
tecting clinics from conduct that hinders medical treatment, as the
basis upon which to fashion injunctions that restrict expressive ac-
tivity in the anti-abortion context."
I. CONSTITUTIONAL Rours OF RIGHTS IMPLICATED BY ANTI-
ABORTION PROTEST
A. Protest and the First Amendment
As guaranteed by the first amendment," the right to freedom
of speech lies at the core of our democratic government." The
" See infra notes 17-54 and accompanying text.
IS See infra notes 55-80 and accompanying text.
15 See infra notes 81-279 and accompanying text.
14 See infra notes 280-348 and accompanying text.
15 See infra notes 349-64 and accompanying text.
16 See infra notes 365-83 and accompanying text.
" The first amendment of the United States Constitution provides that "Congress shall
make no law respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof;
or abridging the freedom of speech, or of the press; or of the right of the people peaceably
to assemble, and to petition the Government for a redress of grievances." U.S. CoNsT. amend.
t.
18 See Terminiello v. Chicago, 337 U.S. 1,4 (1949) (citing Dejonge v. Oregon, 299 U.S.
353,365 (1937)). The Court stated:
It is only through free debate and free exchange of ideas that government
remains responsive to the will of the people and peaceful change is effected.
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United States Supreme Court has recognized the importance of this
right within the framework of our government and has often as-
serted a commitment to the principle that "debate on public issues
should be uninhibited, robust and wide-open." 19 The Court, how-
ever, has not always recognized picketing as protected by the first
amendment guarantee of free speech. 2°
In the early 1900s, when considering the legality of protests
that arose from disputes between labor unions and employers, the
Court challenged the involved pickets as "unlawful conspiracies"
due to the resulting coercion of employees." In the 1911 case of
Gompers v. Bucks Stove & Range Co., for example, the Court held
unlawful a picket involved in a labor dispute. 22
 It reasoned that the
coercive force that the protestors derived from their sheer numbers
carried the picketing beyond the protection of the first amend-
ment. 23
Recognizing the distinction between violent and peaceful pro-
tests, the Court in 1940 upheld first amendment protection of pick-
eting as peaceful protest in Thornhill v. Alabama. 24 In Thornhill, the
defendant participated in a picket line near the place of business of
his former employer. He was subsequently convicted of violating an
Alabama statute that made it unlawful to loiter or picket near a
premise or place of business with the intent to induce others not to
deal with the targeted business. 25
 The defendant argued that the
statute was unconstitutional because it deprived him of his first
amendment rights to freedom of assembly, freedom of speech, and
the right to petition for redress. 26 The United States Supreme Court
The right to speak freely and to promote diversity of ideas and programs is
therefore one of the chief distinctions that sets us apart from totalitarian re-
gimes.
Id.
12
 NAACP v. Claiborne Hardware Co., 458 U.S. 886, 913 (1982) (quoting New York
Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 270 (1964)); see also Terminiello, 337 U.S. at 4.
2D See Note, Constitutional Law—Abortion Protest—First Amendment Speech Rights Outweigh
Privacy Rights of Women Seeking Abortions, 20 COMB. L. REV. 183, 184 (1989).
21 See Compers v. Huck Stove & Range Co., 221 U.S. 418, 439 (1911); see also Hitchman
Coal & Coke Co. v. Mitchell, 245 U.S. 229, 258-59 (1917); Note, supra note 20, at 184.
22 221 U.S. at 439.
25 Id. The Court stated, "In the case of an unlawful conspiracy, the agreement to act in
concert ... gives the words 'Unfair,' 'We don't patronize,' or similar expressions, a force not
inhering in the words themselves, and therefore exceeding any possible right of speech which
a single individual might have." Id.
24 310 U.S. 88, 103, 105 (1940).
25
 Thornhill, 310 U.S. at 91-92.
26 Id. at 92-93.
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held that the statute was unconstitutional because it precluded every
practicable, effective means by which the defendant and other
protestors might be able to educate the public on their views. 27 In
deciding that freedom of speech could only be restricted if it threat-
ened substantial harm to individuals, their property, or their pri-
vacy, the Thornhill Court granted first amendment protection to the
conduct associated with "dissemination of information," which the
court defined to include peaceful picketing. 28
Since Thornhill, the United States Supreme Court has continued
to recognize that picketing is protected by the first amendment. 29
In the 1981 case of NAACP v. Claiborne Hardware Co., the Court
recognized that this constitutional protection extended even to ex-
pressive conduct that is "offensive" or "coercive." 50 In Claiborne
Hardware, members and supporters of the National Association for
the Advancement of Colored People (NAACP) boycotted white mer-
chants in an attempt to secure compliance by both civic and business
leaders with a list of demands for equality and racial justices' The
protestors supported the boycott largely through speeches and non-
violent picketing, though related acts of violence occurred. 32 The
merchants filed an action in the Mississippi Chancery Court for
injunctive relief against the NAACP, another organization, and 146
individual defendants. 33
The Chancery Court rejected the defendants' claim that their
conduct was protected by the first amendment. 34 The chancellor,
noting that secondary boycotts were unlawful under both United
States and Mississippi law, stated that illegal conduct and commu-
nication are not protected by the constitutional provisions relating
to freedom of speech. 33 The Chancery Court consequently imposed
damages on 130 defendants and issued a permanent injunction
enjoining the petitioners, among other things, from "persuading"
any person to boycott the merchants' businesses, from using de-
meaning and obscene language to address people who refused to
participate in the boycott, and from "picketing or patrolling" the
27 Id. at 104-05.
28 See id. at 105-06; see also Note, supra note 20, at 185.
" See, e.g., Police Dep't of Chicago v. Mosley, 408 U.S. 92, 99 (1972).
" 458 U.S. 886, 911 (1982) (citing Organization for a Better Austin v. Keefe, 402 U.S.
415, 419 (1971)).
SL Id. at 907.
32 Id.
33 Id. at 889-90.
34 Id. at 892 n.10.
35 Id.
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premises of any of the merchants." Based on the Chancery Court's
findings that fear of reprisals by the petitioners caused some black
citizens to withold their patronage from the respondents' businesses,
the Supreme Court of Mississippi held that the entire boycott was
unlawful and let the injunction stand. 37 The defendant boycotters
then petitioned the United States Supreme Court for certiorari,
which was granted."
Noting that freedom of speech necessarily includes the oppor-
tunity to persuade others to action, not merely to describe facts, the
Court reversed the Supreme Court of Mississippi, reasoning that
speech does not lose its protected character simply because it may
embarrass or coerce others into action." The Court held that the
nonviolent aspects of petitioners activities were protected by the
first amendment.4 °
Claiborne Hardware illustrates the modern United States Su-
preme Court's reluctance to inhibit certain expressive conduct, in-
cluding speeches and nonviolent picketing.'" This reluctance is,con-
sistent with the Court's acknowledgment of the importance of
preserving the freedom of expression as a cornerstone of our dem-
ocratic society. 42 Yet, despite its conceded importance, freedom of
speech has nonetheless never been held to be absolute; the first
amendment does not guarantee the right to communicate one's
views at all times and places or in any manner that may be desired."
Courts, as well as state and federal governments, may restrict ex-
pression in certain circumstances; however, cognizant of the United
States Supreme Court's oft-stated recognition that the first amend-
ment was designed to secure "the widest possible dissemination of
information," these courts are required to justify every instance of
abridgment."
36 Id. at 893.
37 Id. at 895-96 n.18. Although affirming the Chancery Court's basic finding of liability,
the Mississippi Supreme Court dismissed the cases against 38 of the 146 individual defendants
for lack of proof. Id.
38
 Id. at 896.
39 Id, at 910, 934. The United States Supreme Court remanded the case for further
proceedings. Id. at 934.
4° Id. at 915.
" See, e.g., id. at 913; United States v. Grace, 461 U.S. 171, 177, 183 (1983).
42 See Terminiello v. Chicago, 337 U.S. 1, 4 (1949).
43 See Heffron v. International Soc'y for Krishna Consciousness, 452 U.S. 640, 647
(1980).
44 See Associated Press v. United States, 326 U.S. I, 20 (1945); see also Grace, 461 U.S.
at 177.
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As defined by the Court, the ability of government and the
courts to restrict expressive conduct permissibly is limited." The
Court has held that the government may enforce reasonable time,
place, and manner restrictions on expression as long as they meet
four requirements: first, the restrictions must be content-neutral;
second, they must serve a significant governmental interest; third,
they must be narrowly tailored to effect that interest; and fourth,
they must leave open alternative channels of communication." In
addition to these four requirements, courts will scrutinize any re-
striction, particularly if it is a statute, to ensure that it is not uncon-
stitutionally vague. 47
Courts have been particularly hesitant to restrict expressive
conduct in "public forums."" The United States Supreme Court
liras stated that such public forums, including streets, sidewalks,
arks, and other similar public places, are so historically associated
with the exercise of first amendment rights that access to them for
the purpose of exercising such rights cannot constitutionally be
denied broadly and absolutely. 4° Furthermore, the Court has held
that such areas do not lose their protected status simply because
they abut areas not normally considered public forums. 5° Con-
versely, the Court has stated that an area will not be awarded the
protected status of a "public forum" merely because members of
the public are permitted to come and go at will. 51 Because courts
are hesitant to restrict expressive conduct in public forums, the
designation of an area as a public forum is relevant to the protection
that courts are likely to give expressive conduct taking place in that
area.
45 Grace, 461 U.S. at 177.
46 Id.
47 See Grayned v. City of Rockford, 408 U.S. 104, 108-09 (1972).
46 See, e.g., Grace, 461 U.S. at 177 (federal statute banning distribution of leaflets on
public sidewalk in front of United States Supreme Court building held to be unconstitutional
under first amendment); Hudgens v. NLRB, 424 U.S. 507, 515 (1976) (threat that protestors
would be arrested for criminal trespass held to be constitutional because no first amendment
right to protest on private property).
46 Hudgens, 424 U.S. at 515 (citing Amalgamated Food Employees Union v. Logan Valley
Plaza, 391 U.S. 308, 315 (1968)).
56 Grace, 461 U.S. at 180.
51 Id. at 177 (Supreme Court building not public forum); see also Greer v. Spock, 424
U.S. 828, 836 (1976) (streets and sidewalks within enclosed military reservation not public
forum). The Court has stated that the first amendment has never meant "that people who
want to propagandize protests or views have a constitutional right to do so whenever and
however and wherever they please." fd. at 836 (quoting Adderley v. Florida, 385 U.S. 39, 48
(1966)).
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Since 1900, the United States Supreme Court has expanded
the right to free speech to encompass dissemination of information,
peaceful picketing, and speech that may be considered offensive or
coercive, and has granted particular protection to public forums
where first amendment rights have historically been exercised. 52
The first amendment protection of protest has played a significant
role in the conflict over the right to abortion, as those on each side
of the argument have relied heavily on protest as a means of ex-
pressing their beliefs. Equally significant in the abortion conflict has
been the application of the standard tests for restrictions on ex-
pression, namely, that the restrictions be content-neutral, be nar-
rowly tailored to serve a significant governmental interest, leave
open alternative channels of communication, and not be unconsti-
tutionally vague." Despite the application of the same tests to similar
fact patterns in the anti-abortion protests cases, courts have applied
these tests differently, resulting in restrictions that vary widely in
scope and impact. 54 To grasp fully the issues involved in these cases,
however, one must consider not only the first amendment issues
implicated, but also those issues concerning the right to abortion as
depicted in Roe v. Wade.
B. Right to Abortion
In the 1973 case of Roe v. Wade, the United States Supreme
Court asserted that the constitutional right of personal privacy is
broad enough to encompass a woman's decision whether or not to
terminate her pregnancy. 55 In Roe, the Court struck down a Texas
statute criminalizing abortion as violative of this right. 56 The Court
conceded that the Constitution does not explicitly mention such a
52 See, e.g., Grace, 461 U.S. at 177 (public forums); NAACP v. Claiborne Hardware Co.,
458 U.S. 886, 891 (1982) (offensive or coercive speech); Hudgens, 424 U.S. at 515 (public
forums); Police Dep't of Chicago v. Mosley, 408 U.S. 92, 99 (1972) (peaceful picketing);
Associated Press v. United States, 326 U.S. 1, 20 (1945) (dissemination of information);
Thornhill v. Alabama, 310 U.S. 88, 109 (1940) (peaceful picketing).
53 Frisby v. Schultz, 487 U.S. 474, 481 (1988).
" See, e.g., Eanes v. State, 318 Md. 436, 490, 569 A.2d 604, 606 (1990) (upholding
statute prohibiting loud and unseemly noises); Thompson v. Police Dep't, 145 Misc. 2d 417,
418, 546 N.Y.S.2d 945, 946 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1989) (upholding injunction prohibiting protestors
from moving along sidewalk directly in front of clinic); O.B.G.Y.N. Ass'ns v. Birthright of
Brooklyn and Queens, Inc., 64 A.D.2d 894, 894, 407 N.Y.S.2d 903, 905 (N.Y. App. Div.
1978) (modifying injunction to prohibit picketing that disturbs or endangers the health or
safety of clinic patients).
" 410 U.S. 113, 153 (1973).
w Id. at 164.
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right of privacy, but stated that the history of the Court's constitu-
tional adjudication indicates that such a right does exist under the
Constitution. 57 Writing for the majority, Justice Blackmun noted
that the Court has found at least the roots of the right to privacy
in the first amendment, the fourth and fifth amendments, the ninth
amendment, the penumbras of the Bill of Rights, and in the concept
of liberty guaranteed by the fourteenth amendment." The majority
stated that this guarantee of personal privacy includes an individ-
ual's freedom of personal choice regarding marriage, procreation,
contraception, family relationships, and child rearing and educa-
tion . 59
Though the Court acknowledged the existence of this broad
right to privacy, it stated that this right is not absolute and must be
weighed against the significant state interests in protecting the
health of pregnant women and the potentiality of human life."
Noting that these separate and distinct state interests become more
substantial as the woman reaches term and that each interest be-
comes "compelling" at different points during pregnancy, the Court
established guidelines for state regulation corresponding to trimes-
ter points in pregnancy. 6 ' These trimester guidelines reflected the
Court's view that although a woman's interest in having an abortion
may be substantially greater than the state's interest in her health
towards the beginning of the pregnancy, the state's interest grows
to override the woman's interest as she reaches term."
Subsequent decisions have reinforced the fundamental nature
of the right to privacy identified in Roe.63 Some observers contend,
" Id. at 152. In his concurring opinion, Justice Stewart reinforced this premise, stating:
Tribe full scope of the liberty guaranteed by the Due Process Clause cannot be found in or
limited by the precise terms of the specific guarantees elsewhere provided in the Constitu-
tion." Id. at 169 (Stewart, J., concurring) (quoting Poe v. Ullman, 367 U.S. 497, 543 (1961)
(Harlan, J., dissenting)).
66 Id. at 152.
" Id. at 152-53 (citing Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1, 12 (1967); Skinner v. Oklahoma,
316 U.S. 535, 541-42 (1942); Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438, 953-54 (1972); Prince v.
Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158, 166 (1944); Mayer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390, 399 (1923)).
66 Id. at 154.
61 Id. at 162-63.
62 Id. at 163. In the first trimester, the woman's choice to have an abortion must be free
of state regulation, left only to the medical judgment of her attending physician. Id. at 164.
In the second trimester, the state may, if it chooses, regulate the abortion procedure "in ways
that are reasonably related to maternal health." Id. Finally, in the third trimester, the state,
in promoting its interest in the potentiality of human life, may regulate and even proscribe
abortion, except where necessary for the preservation of the life or health of the mother. Id.
at 164-65.
66 See, e.g., City of Akron v. Akron Center for Reproductive Health, Inc., 462 U.S. 416,
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however, that the Court's recent narrowing of the Roe holding in
the 1989 case of Webster v. Reproductive Health Services" suggests that
the law concerning the right to abortion is in a state of flux. 65 In
Webster, Chief Justice Rehnquist explained that although stare decisis
is the cornerstone of our legal system, it has less power in consti-
tutional cases where, with the exception of constitutional amend-
ments, the Court is the only entity able to make necessary changes. 66
Chief Justice Rehnquist noted that the Court has not refrained from
reconsidering prior constructions of the Constitution that have
proven unworkable and principally unsound, and he placed the Roe
trimester framework in that category. 67
Nonetheless, courts still recognize Roe as holding that the right
to privacy encompasses the right to an abortion, free from govern-
mental interference. The right of privacy apparently does not com-
pel the government to prevent anti-abortion protestors from inter-
fering with a woman's right to choose to terminate a pregnancy
unless these protestors are aided by state action in some way. 68
 Some
420 (1983) (reaffirming Roe); Bellotti v. Baird, 443 U.S. 622, 639 (1978) (discussing the need
to preserve constitutional right to abortion as established in Roe).
64
 Webster v. Reproductive Health Serv., 492 U.S. 490, 521 (1989).
6' See, e.g., National Org. for Women v. Operation Rescue, 726 F. Supp. 1483, 1494
(E.D. Va 1989), aff'd, 914 F.2d 582, 586 (4th Cir. 1990), cert. granted sub nom. Bray v.
Alexandria Women's Health Clinic, 111 S. Ct. 1070 (1991).
66 Webster, 492 U.S. at 518.
67 Id. Chief Justice Rehnquist stated that "the bounds [of] Roe are essentially indeter-
minate, the result has been a web of legal rules that have become increasingly intricate,
resembling a code of regulations rather than a body of constitutional doctrine." Id. at 519;
see also National Org. for Women, 726 F. Supp. at 1494 n.13, wherein the district court observed
that "fallthough the Court noted that the facts of Webster did not present an appropriate
occasion to overturn Roe, its decision left Roe ripe for attack" (citing Webster, 492 U.S. at 521).
The National Org. For Women court provided additional examples of the narrowing of
Roe. Id. at 1494 n.13. See Simopoulos v. Virginia, 462 U.S. 506, 519 (1983) (upholding a state
statutory requirement that second trimester abortions be performed only in licensed clinics);
Harris v. McRae, 448 U.S. 297, 326 (1980) (upholding governmental regulations withholding
public funds for non-therapeutic abortions); Beal v. Doe, 432 U.S. 438, 447 (1977) (Social
Security Act does not require funding non-therapeutic abortions as a condition of partici-
pating in state medicare program); see also Maher v. Roe, 432 U.S. 464, 473-74 (1977)
(upholding state regulation granting Medicaid benefits for live births but denying them for
non-therapeutic abortions).
" See Note, supra note 2, at 706-07. The U.S. Department of Justice has stated that the
protest activities of anti-abortion activists do not require investigation by the federal govern-
ment. In response to letters from pro-choice organizations and clinics demanding an inves-
tigation by the Civil Rights Division into harassment of abortion clinics and women seeking
abortions, the Department wrote:
Despite a widespread belief to the contrary, in virtually no case have the civil
rights statutes been violated by anti-abortion clinic activities. The Supreme Court
has held that the right to abortion is derived from the Fourteenth Amendment.
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courts have contended, however,that a significant governmental in-
terest may still arise in protecting the right to decide to terminate
a pregnancy free from harassment, even in the absence of state
action. 69
C. Clash Between Rights
In response to Roe, anti-abortion organizations historically con-
centrated most of their efforts in the political arena. They have
proposed constitutional amendments to prohibit abortion and leg-
islation to withdraw abortion-related cases from federal court juris-
diction.7° These organizations have also supported legislation that
would both declare that human life exists from conception and
extend fourteenth amendment protections to fetuses.n Although
none of these legislative proposals have succeeded, the anti-abortion
movement, however, has successfully advocated legislation restrict-
ing public funding' for abortion and imposing various regulations
on the performance of abortions. 72
Recently, however, abortion opponents have shifted their focus
from legislatures to direct intervention aimed at abortion clinics,
doctors, and individual women seeking abortions." Sidewalk "coun-
seling" and pickets at abortion clinics have greatly increased in
number.74 The protests themselves have evolved from peaceful
marches to more violent and confrontational demonstrations. 75
Protestors have increasingly trespassed on the property of clinics;
they have hanged on clinic windows, blocked entrances and exits,
lined clinic sidewalks, brandished signs with pro-life slogans and
As such it is protected against interference by the state or its officials. It is not
a right protected against private interference.
Id. at 706-07 n.45 (quoting Letter from Stephen S. Trott to Lyn C. Gill, Cleveland Planned
Parenthood (Aug. 28, 1985)).
69 See, e.g., Lewis v. Pearson Found., 908 F.2d 318, 321-22 (8th Cir. 1990) (personal
privacy "interests would be meaningless were they to be protected only from interference by
the state"); Bering v. Share, 106 Wash. 2d 212, 229-30, 721 P.2d 918, 928 (1986), cert.
dismissed, 479 U.S. 1050 ("protection of [the right to privacy], even from private invasion,
constitutes a compelling State interest"); we also Note, supra note 2, at 706.
7° See Note, supra note 2, at 700 n.13.
71 Id.
72 Id.
" See America's Abortion Dilemma, NEWSWEEK, Jan. 14, 1985, at 20, 23-24. Anti-abortion
and pro-choice advocates agree that failures in the political arena have led to increased use
of "direct action" protest tactics by anti-abortion activists. See also Donovan, The Holy War, 17
Floc PLAN. PERSP. 5, 7, 8 (1985).
7' Note, supra note 2, at 701.
76
 See Donovan, supra note 73, at 6.
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bloody dolls, shouted at patients and called them murderers. 76 They
have posed as patients to gain entrance to facilities, only to spray
paint waiting rooms, drop stink bombs, or chain themselves to
examining tables. 77 Clinics have also increasingly become the targets
of arson and bombings. 78 Moreover, clinic patients, staff, and doc-
tors are often subjected to picketing and harassing phone calls at
their homes; some have even had their families' lives threatened. 79
While increasing numbers of women are seeking to exercise
their right to abortion and the pro-choice movement has galvanized
in reaction to the threat to Roe, right to life organizations have
greatly expanded their number." The increasing number of re-
sulting lawsuits, centering on the conflict between the right to abor-
tion and the right to protest, has forced courts to engage in a
delicate balancing of constitutional rights.
H. LEGAL RESPONSES AND CORRESPONDING CONSTITUTIONAL
REQUIREMENTS FOR RESTRICTIONS ON FREE SPEECH
In the anti-abortion protest cases two constitutional rights are
in conflict: one right is rooted in the free speech and assembly
76
 Id.; see also America's Abortion Dilemma, supra note 73, at 23. A recent study noted that
anti-abortion harassment is seldom limited to one type of harassing activity, and that the
abortion providers who experience harassment are on average subject to five different types
of anti-abortion activity directed at the facility, its staff and patients. Forrest, The Harassment
of U.S. Abortion Providers, 19 FAM. PLAN. PERSP. 10, 10-11 (1987). Among the various forms
of anti-abortion harassment that clinics are subject to, the study listed: picketing, bomb
threats, literature distributed inside facility, physical contact with or blocking of patients by
picketers, mass scheduling of no-show appointments, demonstrations loud enough to be
heard in patient areas, invasion of facility by demonstrators, vandalism, jamming of telephone
tines, death threats, tracing of patients' license plates, and picketing of staff members' homes.
Id. at 10.
" See Donovan, supra note 73, at 6.
'B In Planned Parenthood v. Project Jericho, for example, the court noted that the abortion
clinic filing suit in that case had moved to a temporary site when its facilities were destroyed
by a firebomb. 52 Ohio St. 3d 56, 57, 556 N.E.2d 157, 160 (1990). A pipe bomb was found
in the temporary facilities a year later. Id.
In reporting on the case of Curtis Beseda, a pro-life advocate who was charged with
setting fire to an abortion clinic on four separate occasions, Finally forcing it out of business,
The National Law Journal noted a nationwide increase in abortion-clinic arson and bombings.
See Lewis, A Violent Protest to Protect Unborn Lives, NAT'L L.J., Nov. 26, 1984, at 6, col. I.
79 Id.; see also America's Abortion Dilemma, supra note 73, at 23; Forrest, supra note 76, at
10.
°° See generally Lacayo, Whose Life Is It!, TIME, May I, 1989, at 20-21; Wills, supra note
6, at 27-28; Connors, supra note 6, at 402. Approximately 30% of all pregnancies, excluding
stillbirths and miscarriages, end in abortions in the United States. Lacayo, at 21. The number
of abortions in the United States each year has leveled off at around 1.6 million, up from
744,600 in 1973 when Roe was handed down. Id. One-fifth of American women above the
age of 15 have had an abortion. Id.
July 1991]	 ANTI-ABORTION PROTESTS	 847
clause of the first amendment; the other stems from a "penumbra"
of rights contained in the Constitution. It has been particularly
problematic for courts to rule on the validity of restrictive statutes
and to sculpt injunctive relief that preserves both of these rights to
the greatest extent possible. 81 Trial courts have been presented with
this dilemma under a variety of claims. Abortion clinics and pro-
spective patients have brought suits on claims of trespass, nuisance,
invasion of privacy, conspiracy, and intentional infliction of emo-
tional distress, as well as recent actions charging violations of the
Civil Rights Conspiracy Act," seeking to have the protestors re-
s' See, e.g., Mississippi Women's Medical Clinic v. McMillan, 866 F.2d 788, 791 (5th Cir.
1989).
82
 The Civil Rights Conspiracy Act, 42 U.S.C. § 1985(3) (1989), requires four essential
elements to state a cause of action:
(i) a conspiracy;
(ii) for the purpose of depriving, either directly or indirectly, any person
or class of persons of the equal protection of the laws, or of equal' privileges
and immunities under the laws;
(iii)an act in furtherance of the conspiracy;
(iv)whereby a person is either injured in his person or property or deprived
of any right or privilege of a citizen of the United States.
Id.; see National Org. for Women v. Operation Rescue, 726 F. Supp. 1483, 1492 (E.D. Va.
1989), aff 'd, 914 F.2d 582, 584 (4th Cir. 1990), cert. granted sub nom. Bray v. Alexandria
Women's Health Clinic, 111 S. Ct. 1070 (1991) (citing Griffen v. Breckenridge, 403 U.S. 88,
102-03 (1971).
Abortion clinics have brought several cases against abortion protestors charging violations
of this statute. See, e.g., Lewis v. Pearson Found., Inc., 908 F.2d 318, 319 (8th Cir. 1990);
Mississippi Women's Medical Clinic, 866 F.2d at 791; New York State Nat'l Org. for Women v.
Terry, 886 F.2d 1339, 1344 (2d Cir. 1989), cert. denied, 110 S. Ct. 2206 (1990); Portland
Feminist Women's Health Center v. Advocates For Life, 712 F. Supp. 165, 166 (D. Or. 1988);
Roe v. Abortion Abolition Soc'y, 811 F.2d 931, 932 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 848 (1987);
National Org. for Women, 726 F. Supp. at 1490; National Abortion Fed'n v. Operation Rescue,
721 F. Supp. 1168, 1169 (C.D. Cal. 1989); Cousins v. Terry, 721 F. Supp. 426, 428 (N.D.N.Y.
1989); Roe v. Operation Rescue, 710 F. Supp. 577, 580 (E.D. Pa. 1989).
In order to succeed on a section 1985(3) claim, a plaintiff must establish the existence
of a class-based discriminatory animus. See National Org. for Women, 726 F. Supp. at 1492; see
aLso Lewis, 908 F.2d at 318, 324. Despite the lack of uniformity on the issue, the majority of
courts have concluded that a gender-based animus satisfies the conspiracy requirement of
the Civil Rights Act and that women seeking abortions constitute a class under the statute,
See, e.g., Lewis, 908 F.2d at 324-25; National Org. for Women, 726 F. Supp. at 1492-93; Portland
Feminist Women's Health Center, 712 F. Supp. at 169; Operation Rescue, 710 F. Supp. at 581;
New York State Nat'l Org. for Women, 704 F. Supp. at 1259. But see, e.g., Abortion Abolition Soc'y,
811 F.2d at 937 (patients, doctors, abortion clinics and their staffs do not form a protected
class under section 1985(3)); National Abortion Fed'n, 721 F, Supp. at 1170 (same).
Once plaintiffs are able to allege sufficiently a class-based discriminatory animus, they
must then allege interference with a right protected by § 1985(3), New York State Nat'l Org.
for Women, 704 F. Supp. at 1258. Although some courts have recognized that the right to
privacy necessitates protection from even private interference, most courts have required the
plaintiff to show state action to make out a claim under the Civil Rights Act on the basis of
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strained from blocking their doors and harassing clients. Once a
plaintiff successfully manages to state and establish a cause of action
entitling him or her to relief against the anti-abortion protestor, the
defendant protestors defend their activities by asserting their rights
to free speech and assembly, thus triggering the conflict of rights."
Courts are also forced to confront this conflict when anti-abortion
protestors challenge the validity of local ordinances restricting their
rights to protest. Again, courts must balance the conflicting interests
of the protestors, the abortion patients and the local government
in evaluating the challenged ordinance.
In attempting to preserve the interests of abortion patients in
exercising their right to abortion, the interests of abortion clinics in
being able to provide their services, and the interests of the govern-
ment in preventing harm to its citizens, courts must also be cogni-
zant of the protestors' interest in expressing their views on abortion.
As previously noted, the ability of government and the courts to
restrict expressive conduct permissibly is limited, particularly in
public forums.84 They may enforce reasonable time, place, and
manner restrictions as long as these restrictions are content-neutral,
serve a significant governmental interest, are narrowly tailored to
effect that interest, leave open alternative channels of communica-
tion, and, particularly concerning statutory restrictions, are not un-
constitutionally vague. 85
this right. See is!.; Operation Rescue, 710 F. Supp. at 582. But see Lewis, 908 F.2d at 322 (state
action not required for claim of interference with right to privacy). Cases brought under the
civil rights conspiracy statute have generally been resolved on the claim of a deprivation of
another right, one that is easier to support. In National Org. for Women, for example, the
court declined to consider the plaintiff's claim based on a fundamental right to abortion
where an independent basis for relief existed in the deprivation of a right to travel. See 726
F. Supp. at 1494. The court stated, "[c[mins should avoid constitutional questions where
other grounds are available and dispositive of the issues presented." Id.
Courts have decided the majority of these cases on the basis of the deprivation of the
constitutional right to interstate travel, which is entitled to protection under the statute from
even private interference. See, e.g., New York State Nat'l Org. for Women, 886 F.2d at 1361;
National Org. for Women, 726 F. Supp. at 1493; Cousins, 721 F. Supp. at 429; Operation Rescue,
710 F. Supp. at 582.
" See, e.g., Planned Parenthood v. Operation Rescue, 406 Mass. 701, 705, 550 N.E.2d
1361, 1364 (1990); Planned Parenthood v. Project Jericho, 52 Ohio St. 3d 56, 59, 556 N.E.2d
157, 161 (1990).
"4 See United States v. Grace, 461 U.S. 171, 177 (1983).
k'	 Grayned v. City of Rockford, 408 U.S. 104, 108 (1972).
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A. Content-Neutrality
The first of these requirements, "content-neutrality," restricts
expression without regard to its content. 86 Laws prohibiting noisy
speeches near schools and hospitals, banning billboards in residen-
tial communities, or forbidding the distribution of leaflets in public
places are examples of content-neutral restrictions." The ordinance
upheld by the United States Supreme Court in the 1949 case of
Kovacs v. Cooper is another example of a content-neutral restriction
of expression. 88 In Kovacs, a New Jersey ordinance prohibited the
use on public streets of "sound truck[s]" or other instruments that
emit "loud and raucous noises" while attached to vehicles on public
streets." Such a prohibition restricted communication without re-
gard to the message conveyed.
Similarly, in the 1984 case of Clark v. Community For Creative
Non-Violence, the Supreme Court upheld a National Park Service
content-neutral regulation as constitutional." The regulation pro-
hibited camping in certain parks, including Layfayette Park and the
Mall, which adjoin national memorials in Washington, D.C. 9 ' Dem-
onstrators who had been barred from sleeping in these parks in
connection with a demonstration intended to call attention to the
plight of the homeless brought suit to enjoin the application of the
regulations to their demonstration, claiming that the restrictions, as
applied to them, violated the first amendment. 92 In upholding the
constitutionality of the camping prohibition, the Court scrutinized
the regulation and found it to be content-neutral in that its appli-
cation was not triggered by a disagreement with the message pre-
sented. 93
In contrast to content-neutral restrictions, restrictions of speech
based on the subject matter of the speech, the identity of the au-
dience or speaker, or the viewpoint being expressed are "content-
based." Some commentators contend that such restrictions distort
the free exchange of ideas." Such restrictions, therefore, are pre-
" See Stone, Restrictions of Speech Because of its Content: The Peculiar Case of Subject-Matter
Restrictions, 46 U. Cm. L. REV. 81, 81 (1978).
97 See Stone, Content Regulation and the First Amendment, 25 WM. & MARY L. REV. 189,
189-90(1983).
99 336 U.S. 77, 78 (1949).
99 Id. at 78.
99
 468 U.S. 288. 295 (1984).
91 Id. at 289-90.
92
 Id. at 292.
93
 Id. at 295.
94 Note, Abortion, Protest, and Constitutional Protection, 62 WASH. L. Rzv. 311, 312 (1987);
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sumed to be unconstitutional and are carefully scrutinized by the
courts to ensure that the government is not intentionally suppress-
ing a particular point of view that it finds offensive. 95 The Supreme
Court has, nonetheless, permitted content-based restrictions where
they fall within certain narrow categorical exceptions to first amend-
ment protection or where they further a compelling governmental
interest, and are narrowly drawn to achieve that end. 96 As long as
either of these requirements is met, courts may hold restrictions
constitutional even if they directly limit oral or written expression. 97
The 1972 case of Police Department v. Mosley exemplifies the
United States Supreme Court's heightened focus of content-based
see also Barnes, Regulations of Speech Intended to Affect Behavior, 63 DEN. U.L. Rev. 37, 47
(1985).
96 See Stone, supra note 87, at 194, 196-97. Given that the distinction between content-
based and content-neutral restrictions is often difficult to discern, commentators have disa-
greed about the wisdom and practicality of having courts rely on such distinctions to deter-
mine the level of scrutiny that the restrictions are to receive. Professor Geoffrey Stone, for
example, contends that "[a]lthough the differences between content-based and content-
neutral restrictions are more elusive than might be expected, and are often only differences
of degree, such differences do exist, and the Court's exacting scrutiny of content-based
restrictions can be explained and justified." Stone, supra note 86, at 115. Professor Martin
Redish, on the other hand, finds it "difficult to understand why content-neutral regulations
should receive any less scrutiny than other types of restriction." Redish, The Content Distinction
in First Amendment Analysis, 34 STAN. L. REV. 113, 130 (1981). He states:
The most puzzling aspect of the distinction between content-based and
content-neutral restrictions is that either restriction reduces the total sum of
information or opinion disseminated. That governmental regulation impedes
all forms of speech, rather than only selected viewpoints or subjects, does not
alter the fact that the regulation impairs the free flow of expression. Whatever
the rationale one adopts for the constitutional protection of speech, the goals
behind that rationale are undermined by any limitation on expression, content-
based or not.
Id. at 128.
96 See Grace, 461 U.S. at 177; see also Perry Educ. Ass'n v. Perry Local Educators' Ass'n,
460 U.S. 37, 45 (1983).
97 See Clark v. Community For Creative Non-Violence, 468 U.S. 288, 293 (1984). The
categories of speech that do not receive first amendment protection include obscenity and
speech that incites immediate violence, See Paris Adult Theater I v. Slaton, 413 U.S. 49, 54
(1973) (obscene materials not protected by first amendment); Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire,
315 U.S. 568, 571-72 (1942). In Chaplinsky, the Court excluded certain categories of speech
from first amendment protection because they "are no essential part of any exposition of
ideas," and because their "very utterance inflicts injury" or "tends to incite an immediate
breach of the peace." Id. Such speech, the Court added, is "of slight social value as a step to
truth." Id. Additionally, first amendment protection does not extend to speech that threatens
national security. See Schenck v. United States, 249 U.S. 47, 52 (1919). Defendant Schenck
and others had been convicted under the Espionage Act of 1917 for circulating literature
intended to encourage obstruction of the draft. Id. at 48-49. The Court held the conviction
constitutional on the basis of the nature of the words, which was such "as to create a clear
and present danger that they [would] bring about the substantive evils that Congress had a
right to prevent." Id. at 52.
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restrictions.98 In Mosley, the Court considered the constitutionality
of a Chicago ordinance that prohibited picketing or demonstrating
on a public way within 150 feet of a school building while school
was in session. 99 The ordinance expressly exempted peaceful labor
picketing from its otherwise absolute prohibition, and was thus not
content-neutral.'" The Court struck down the ordinance as uncon-
stitutional on the grounds that it made an impermissible distinction
between labor picketing and other peaceful picketing. 1 °' The Court
reasoned that the ordinance's central problem was that it described
peaceful picketing in terms of subject matter.'" Above all else, the
Court stated, the first amendment prohibits government from re-
stricting expression because of its message, its ideas, its subject
matter, or its content.'" The Court argued that the control of
content undercuts the nation's commitment to the uninhibited ex-
change of ideas, and that therefore, "[s]elective exclusions from a
public forum may not be based on content alone, and may not be
justified by reference to content alone."'"
In the anti-abortion protest context, courts have upheld con-
tent-neutral restrictions in a variety of forms.'° 5 In the 1989 case of
Medlin v. Palmer, for example, the United States Court of Appeals
for the Fifth Circuit upheld the constitutionality of an ordinance
that prohibited the use of hand-held amplifiers within 150 feet of
any school or medical facility.'" After being threatened with arrest
for violation of this ordinance, an anti-abortion activist brought suit
challenging the restriction, contending, among other things, that
the ordinance was not content-neutral. 107 The protestor argued that
it was actually content-based and tailored so as to prevent anti-
abortion activists from expressing their moral and religious views
to patients of abortion clinics. The court rejected this argument,
99 408 U.S. 92 (1972).
" Id. at 92-93.
loo Id. at 93 .
' 01 Id. at 94.
109 Id. at 95.
10 Id.
104 Id. at 96.
ja9 See, e.g., Medlin v. Palmer, 874 F.2d 1085, 1086 (5th Cir. 1989) (ordinance prohibiting
use of hand-held amplifiers near medical clinics); Portland Feminist Women's Health Center
v. Advocates for Life, 859 F.2d 681, 686 (9th Cir. 1988) (injunction prohibiting noise inter-
fering with abortion clinic's provision of medical services); Thompson v. Police Dep't., 145
Misc. 2c1 417, 420, 546 N.Y.S.2d 945, 947 (1989) (police barricade positioned in front of
abortion clinic entrance behind which all protestors were directed to stand).
'06 874 F.2d 1085, 1086 (5th Cir. 1989).
I" Id. at 1090.
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stating that the ordinance made no reference whatsoever to the
content of speech, but instead, merely prohibited amplified speech
within 150 feet of certain facilities without regard for what was
being said. The court stressed that the ordinance was tailored so as
to protect the aged, the ill, and school children from the nuisance
of loudspeaker noise "regardless of what message issues from the
loudspeaker." 108 Based on this reasoning, the court found the or-
dinance to be content-neutral.
Similarly, in the 1988 case of Portland Feminist Women's Health
Center v. Advocates for Life, the. United States Court of Appeals for
the Ninth Circuit found an,, ordinance enjoining protestors from
obstructing passage to an abortion clinic and from producing noise
substantially interfering with the clinic's provision of medical ser-
vices to be content-neutra1. 1 °9 The court stated that the injunction
did not refer to the specific viewpoints asserted by the demonstra-
tors, but focused exclusively on the location and manner of their
expression. Noting that the injunction protected the clinic from
loudness and physical intimidation and not from content of speech,
the court concluded that the injunction was a content-neutral re-
striction of expression."°
In the 1978 case of 0.B.G.Y.N. Assocations v. Birthright of Brooklyn
and Queens, Inc., on the other hand, the Supreme Court, Appellate
Division, of New York struck down a provision of an injunction
issued by a lower court because it was content-based."' Although
the court upheld provisions prohibiting chanting, shouting, and
picketing that would incite riot in the vicinity of an abortion clinic,
the court deleted a provision enjoining the use of such words as
"murder," and "kill" on placards." 2 The court noted that the first
amendment means that government has no power to restrict ex-
pression on the basis of content." 3 The court further noted that
the initially enjoined words were not "fighting words," which are
beyond first amendment protection." 4 Rather, the court stated that
the message that the defendants sought to communicate, an ex-
'° Id.
1 "9 859 F.2d 681, 686 (9th Cir. 1988). For text of the injunction, see infra note 173.
"° Portland Feminist Women's Health Center, 859 F.2d at 686. For additional discussion of
this case, see infra notes 172-77 and accompanying text.
"I 64 A.D.2d 894, 895, 407 N.Y.S.2d 903, 906 (1978).
112 Id. at 894-95, 407 N.Y.S.2d at 905-06.
nu Id. at 895, 407 N.Y.S.2d at 906.
114 Id.
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pression of their views on an important public issue, was entitled to
the greatest constitutional protection." 5 In deleting the content-
based restriction, the court reasoned that "[i]nherent in suppressing
the use of particular words—even if provocative or controversial—
is the grave risk of inhibiting the expression of ideas."" 6
These cases show that in order to constitute a permissible re-
striction on expression according to the tests set out by the Supreme
Court, the restriction must be content-neutral. Content-neutral re-
strictions are those that limit expression without regard to the mes-
sage conveyed. Content-based restrictions, on the other hand, are
presumed unconstitutional and are scrutinized to ensure that the
government is not intentionally suppressing a viewpoint it finds
offensive.
B. Significant State and Governmental Interests
The second requirement necessary to uphold a restriction on
free speech is that it "serve a significant governmental interest."
The United States Supreme Court has recognized several significant
government and state interests in cases restricting protest, includ-
ing, among others, interests in keeping streets and sidewalks free
of obstruction, preserving the normal activity of particular areas,
protecting medical environments from disruptive conduct, protect-
ing residential privacy, and protecting people from unwelcome
noise.' 17 Courts have cited each of these interests, in addition to an
interest in preserving the right to abortion, in considering restric-
tions on expression in the anti-abortion protest context.' 18
118 Id. at 895-96, 407 N.Y.S.2d at 906.
16 Id. at 896, 407 N.Y.S.2d at 906.
See, e.g.. Frisby v. Schultz, 487 U.S. 474, 484 (1988) (interest in protecting residential
privacy); Heffron v. International Soc'y for Krishna Consciousness, Inc., 452 U.S. 640, 649-
50 (1981) (interest in protecting safety and convenience of persons using public forum);
NLRB v. Baptist Hosp., Inc., 442 U.S. 773, 791 (1979) (Burger, C.J., concurring) (interest
in preventing conduct infringing upon medical care); Grayned v. City of Rockford, 408 U.S.
104, 119 (1972) (interest in preserving normal activity of school); Cox v. New Hampshire,.
312 U.S. 569, 574 (1941) (interest in regulating use of streets for safety of people).
"8 See, e.g., Frisby, 487 U.S. 474, 484 (1988) (interest in residential privacy); New York
State Nat'l Org. for Women v. Terry, 886 F.2d 1339, 1364 (2d Cir. 1989) (interest in
maintaining safety, controlling traffic on the streets and sidewalks of an urban environment),
cert. denied, 110 S. Ct. 2206 (1990); Portland Feminist Women's Health Center v. Advocates
for Life, 859 F.2d 681, 686 (9th Cir. 1988) (interest in protecting medical clinic from
disruptive conduct); Bering v. Share, 106 Wash. 2d 212, 229-30, 721 P.2d 918, 929 (1986)
(interest in protecting right to privacy), cert. dismissed, 479 U.S. 1050 (1987).
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1. Keeping Streets and Sidewalks Free From Obstruction
A number of United States Supreme Court cases recognize that
the state has a substantial interest in keeping community streets and
sidewalks open and available for movement of people and prop-
erty."9 In the 1968 case of Cameron v. Johnson, for example, the -
Court upheld a statute that prohibited picketing that obstructed or
unreasonably interfered with entrances and exits of public build-
ings, including courthouses, and with traffic on the streets or side-
walks adjoining those buildings.' 2° In Cameron, civil rights organi-
zations staged a large demonstration at a county courthouse to
protest racial voting discrimination and to encourage Negro voter
registration.'" When over fifty picketers were arrested for violating
the Mississippi Anti-Picketing Law, they filed suit in the District
Court for the Southern District of Mississippi, seeking a judgment
declaring the statute to be invalid for overbreadth and vagueness,
and an injunction restraining state officials from enforcing the stat-
ute. 122 After the three-judge court initially dismissed the complaint,
concluding that the case did not compel the granting of such ex-
traordinary relief, the Supreme Court vacated the dismissal and
remanded the case for reconsideration.'23 On remand, the three-
judge court conducted an evidentiary hearing and again dismissed,
this time with prejudice.' 24
The Supreme Court noted probable jurisdiction and affirmed
the district court's decision.' 25 The Court upheld the finding that
the statute was neither so broad nor so vague as to be unconstitu-
tional, basing its decision on the fact that the statute advanced
important state interests and proscribed only conduct that ob-
structed sidewalks, streets, and entrances to public buildings. 126 The
Court asserted that the regulation of conduct that had such an
im See Cameron v. Johnson, 390 U.S. 611, 617 (1968); Cox, 312 U.S. at 574; Schneider
v. State, 308 U.S. 147, 160 (1939). The Court in Schneider noted that Imlunicipal authorities,
as trustees for the public, have the duty to keep their communities' streets open and available
for the movement of people and property, the primary purpose to which streets are dedi-
cated." Schneider, 308 U.S. at 160.
120 390 U.S. 611, 622 (1968).
121 Id. at 613-14.
122 Id. at 612-13.
126 Id. at 613.
124 Id.
126 Id. at 614.
126
 Id. at 617, 622.
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obstructive effect did not abridge constitutional liberty "since such
activity bears no necessary relationship to the freedom to . . . dis-
tribute information or opinion." 27 The Court indicated that ob-
structive conduct, such as that which unreasonably interfered with
ingress and egress to the courthouse, was not entitled to constitu-
tional protection. The fact that free speech was intermingled with
such conduct did not change its unprotected status.' 28
Similarly, in 1981, in Heffron v. International Soc'y for Krishna
Consciousness, Inc., the Supreme Court, in upholding a restriction
on expressive conduct, recognized a state's significant interest in
maintaining "the orderly movement" of a crowd at a large state
fair.' 29
 In Heffron, a Krishna religious organization filed suit to
enjoin enforcement of a rule prohibiting the sale or distribution of
any merchandise, including printed or written material, at the fair
outside of specified locations. It contended that the rule violated its
first amendment rights.'" The Minnesota Supreme Court had re-
versed the trial court's finding that the rule was not an unconsti-
tutional restriction on the Krishnas, stating that the state's justifi-
cations for the rule were inadequate to warrant the restriction and
could have been served by means less restrictive of the Krishnas'
first amendment rights."'
Granting the state officials' petition for certiorari, the United
States Supreme Court reversed the Minnesota Supreme Court's
holding of unconstitutionality.' 32 The Court began by recognizing
a state's interest in protecting the "safety and convenience" of per-
sons using a public forum as a valid government objective.'" The
Court suggested further that consideration of a forum's special
attributes is relevant to the constitutionality of a regulation restrict-
ing free speech because the significance of the governmental inter-
est must be scrutinized in light of the nature and function of the
forum involved.'" Analyzing these attributes, the Court upheld the
restriction, reasoning that the flow of crowds and demands of safety
127 Id. at 617 (quoting Schneider v. State, 308 U.S. 147,161 (1939)).
133 Id. at 617.
133
 452 U.S. 640,650-51 (1981).
IN Id, at 643-44. The rule did not prevent organization members "from walking about
the fairgrounds and communicating the organization's views with fair patrons in face-to-face
discussions." Id.
131 Id, at 645-46.
134 Id. at 656.
133 Id. at 650.
134 Id. at 650-51.
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were so pressing in the context of the fair that they validated the
significant governmental interest.'n
In the abortion protest context, courts have upheld restrictions
on expressive activity on the basis of a governmental interest in
"keeping community streets and sidewalks open and available for
movement of people and property."' 36 In the 1989 case of Thompson
v. Police Department, for example, the New York Supreme Court
upheld a use of a police barricade reasoning that it advanced such
an interest. 137 In Thompson, an abortion protestor sought to enjoin
the New York City Police Department from placing a single police
barricade, behind which all demonstrators were directed to stand,
in front of an abortion clinic entrance.' 38 The protestor claimed
that the barricade unconstitutionally limited her first amendment
right to free speech and peaceable assembly because it prevented
her from moving along the sidewalk directly in front of the clinic
and speaking to women to dissuade them from having abortions.
The New York Supreme Court upheld the use of the barricade
eight feet from the entrance of the clinic on the basis that it rea-
sonably advanced a substantial state interest in "keeping the side-
walk uncongested and avoiding the potential for violence."' 39
Similarly, in the 1989 case of New York State National Organization
for Women v. Terry, the United States Court of Appeals for the
Second Circuit upheld an injunction that prohibited abortion
protestors from trespassing on the premises of specified abortion
clinics, from obstructing ingress to or egress from these clinics, and
from tortiously harassing or physically abusing people entering or
leaving these facilities."° The court reasoned that the injunction
effectuated significant governmental interests in protecting public
safety by managing traffic on busy urban streets and sidewalks."'
These cases demonstrate that some courts recognize the state
interest in keeping community streets and sidewalks open and avail-
able for movement of people and property as a valid governmental
interest for the purposes of restricting free speech. The recognition
of this interest apparently stems from the relatively great value these
courts have assigned to the ability of states to protect the safety and
155 Id. at 651.
156 Id.
151
	 Misc. 2d at 418, 546 N.Y.S,2d at 946.
"B Id.
1" Id. at 421, 422, 546 N.Y.S.2d at 947, 948.
I'D 886 F.2d 1339, 1363 (2d Cir. 1989), cert. denied, 110 S. Ct. 2206 (1990).
111 Id. at 1345-46 n.l.
July 1991]
	
ANTI-ABORTION PROTESTS	 857
convenience of individuals using public forums and the relatively
low value courts have assigned obstructive conduct.
2. Preserving the Normal Activity of Particular Areas
The United States Supreme Court has also recognized a sig-
nificant governmental interest in preserving the normal activity of
particular areas. In considering the reasonableness of a restriction,
the Court has scrutinized the nature of a place, the pattern of its
normal activities, and whether the manner of expression is basically
incompatible with the normal activity of a particular place at a
particular time.' 42
In the 1965 case of Cox v. Louisiana, for example, the Supreme
Court upheld a statute that regulated disruptive speech near a
courthouse.'" In that case, Cox led a civil rights demonstration of
about 2,000 students at a courthouse to protest discrimination and
the previous day's arrest of twenty-three fellow students.' 44 At the
demonstration, students sang and carried signs in an area near the
courthouse that police officials had apparently set aside for their
protest.' 45 After Cox encouraged the demonstrators to sit in at lunch
counters that would not serve meals to blacks, the police ordered
them to break up.H6 When the demonstrators refused, the police
dispersed them with tear gas.' 47 The next day, Cox was arrested
and charged with four offenses, including picketing before a court-
house.'" When the Louisiana Supreme Court upheld his conviction,
Cox appealed to the United States Supreme Court, contending the
statute was unconstitutional on its face and as applied to him.'"
Though the Court reversed his conviction on the grounds that
the police officials had led him to believe that he was not in violation
of the statute, the Court held that the statute itself was constitu-
tional.' 5° The Court indicated that, because of the special nature of
the place, persons could be constitutionally prohibited from pick-
142 See, e.g., Grayned v. City of Rockford, 408 U.S. 104, 116 (1972); N.Y. State Nat'l Org.
for Women, 886 F.2d at 1363.
"5 Cox v. Louisiana (Cox II), 379 U.S. 559, 564 (1965).
L44 Id. at 560. The facts were set out in the companion case, Cox v. Louisiana (Cox I),
379 U.S. 536, 538-40 (1965).
1 " Cox I, 379 U.S. at 540-41.
146 Id. at 542-43.
147 Id. at 543-44.
148 Id. at 538, 544.
149 Cox V. Louisiana (Cox II), 379 U.S. 559, 560 (1965).
' 5° Id. at 564, 575.
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eting in or near a courthouse with an intent to obstruct the admin-
istration of justice. 15 ' The Court pointed to a legitimate state interest
in protecting its judicial system from the pressures created by court-
house picketing.' 52
Similarly, the Court has upheld ordinances prohibiting expres-
sive conduct disturbing the peace and good order of the school
environment.'" In the 1972 case of Grayned v. Rockford, the Court
upheld an antinoise ordinance that prohibited conduct tending to
disrupt classwork, reasoning that the city had a significant interest
in having an undisrupted school session.'" The case centered on a
demonstration in front of a high school at which approximately 200
people marched around the school building to protest perceived
inequality within the school.'" The protest could allegedly be heard
within the building, distracting hundreds of students from their
school activities, and generally disrupting school procedure. The
police arrested forty of the protestors, including Richard Grayned,
who was tried and convicted of violating a Rockford antinoise or-
dinance.'" Grayned appealed his conviction directly to the Supreme
Court of Illinois, challenging the constitutionality of the ordinance.
After the Supreme Court of Illinois held that the ordinance was
constitutional on its face, the United States Supreme Court noted
probable jurisdiction and affirmed the lower court's decision.' 57
In addressing the issue of whether the ordinance unconstitu-
tionally restricted expressive conduct, the Court stated that the
crucial question was whether the manner of restricted expression
was incompatible with the normal activity of the school.' On the
basis that the ordinance did not unnecessarily restrict expression,
but prohibited only conduct that disrupted normal school activity,
the Court upheld the ordinance.' 59
151 Id. at 562.
152 Id.
155 See, e.g„ Grayned v. City of Rockford, 408 U.S. 104, 120 (1972).
154 Id. at 119-20.
155 Id. at 105.
158
 Id. at 106.
57 Id.
158 Id. at 116.
159 Id, at 121. The Court reconciled its holding with the 1969 case of Tinker v. Des Moines
Independent Community School District, in which the Court had held that the school district
could not punish students for wearing black arm bands to school in protest of the Vietnam
war. 393 U.S. 503, 514 (1969). The Court in Grayned stated that Tinker did not stand for the
proposition that anyone had "an absolute right to use all parts of a school building or its
immediate environs for his unlimited expressive purposes." Grayned, 408 U.S. at 117-18.
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In these cases, the Court has recognized a significant govern-
mental interest in preserving the normal activity of particular areas.
In determining the applicability of such an interest, courts may
therefore consider the nature of the place and the pattern of its
normal activity, and whether the manner of expression to be re-
stricted is basically incompatible with the normal activity of the place
at a particular time. The recognition of such an interest implies that
the activities undertaken in certain areas are of such a special nature
that even the right to free speech should not be allowed to interfere
with them.
3. Protecting Clinical Facilities From Conduct That Disrupts the
Provision of Medical Care
Related to the state interest in preserving the normal activities
of particular areas is the recognition of a governmental interest in
protecting medical facilities from disruptive conduct.' 6° The Su-
preme Court has acknowledged that expressive conduct may be
prohibited when outweighed by the interests of providing an envi-
ronment conducive to health care. 16 t In NLRB v. Baptist Hospital,
Inc., for example, the Court upheld hospital restrictions on expres-
sion designed to protect patients from upsetting speech. 162 In Baptist
Hospital, the hospital had instituted a rule that prohibited solicitation
by its employees at all times in any area of the hospital that was
accessible to the public.' 63 The scope of this ban included the lobby,
gift shop and cafeteria on the first floor of the hospital as well as
the corridors and sitting rooms on the other floors, which housed
either patients' rooms or operating and therapy rooms. 164 The
Court, stressing the need to maintain a tranquil atmosphere within
hospitals, stated that, with respect to the corridors and sitting rooms,
160 See NLRB v. Baptist Hosp., Inc., 442 U.S. 773, 791 (1979) (Burger, CT, concurring);
Beth Israel Hosp. v. NLRB, 437 U.S. 483, 505 (1978); Medlin v. Palmer, 874 F.2d 1085,
1090 (5th Cir. 1989); Portland Feminist Women's Health Center v. Advocates for Life, 859
F.2d 681, 686 (9th Cir. 1988); O.B.G.Y,N. Ass'ns v. Birthright of Brooklyn and Queens, Inc.,
64 A.D.2d 894, 895, 407 N.Y.S.2d 903, 906 (N.Y.App. Div. 2d 1978).
Other courts, dealing with clinic blockade cases, have upheld a governmental interest in
preserving the right, common to all members of the general public, of access to medical care.
See, e.g., Town of West Hartford v. Operation Rescue, 726 F. Supp. 371, 381 (D.Conn. 1989)
(right to medical services); New York State Nat'l Org. for Women v. Terry, 704 F. Supp.
1247, 1261-62 (S.D.N.Y. 1989) (right to access to medical care).
' 6 ' See Baptht Hosp., 442 U.S. at 785-86.
182
 Id. at 790.
'6' Id. at 775.
164 Id. at 775-76.
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the hospital had justified its prohibition of solicitation as "necessary
to avoid disruption of health-care operations or disturbance of pa-
tients."65 The Court, however, struck down the portion of the
prohibition that related to solicitation in the cafeteria, gift shop and
lobby, areas maintained primarily for the accommodation of visitors
and not for patient care.' 66 The Court indicated that the hospital
had failed to show that the ban in these areas was necessary to
maintaining a tranquil hospital environment conducive to successful
patient care.' 67 In a concurring opinion, Chief Justice Burger re-
inforced the special nature of hospitals and asserted that interfer-
ence with its primary objective of patient care should not be toler-
ated.'68 Thus, the Supreme Court recognized a significant
governmental interest in protecting the environment of medical
facilities.
In the 1985 case of American College of Obstetricians and Gynecol-
ogists, Pennsylvania Section v. Thornburgh, a Pennsylvania district
court, on remand from the United States Supreme Court, examined
the potential harm to women seeking abortions caused by harass-
ment at the hands of pro-life demonstrators. 169 The court found
that the verbal harassment of women entering and leaving clinics
increased their feelings of anxiety and exacerbated any emotional
problems associated with the abortion decision and procedure.'"
Furthermore, the court found that the heightened anxiety could
adversely affect the medical procedure itself. In supporting its find-
165 Id. at 790, 781.
166 Id. at 786.
157 Id.
Id. at 791 (Burger, C.J., concurring). Chief Justice Burger stated:
1 would think no "evidence" is needed to establish the proposition that the
primary mission of every hospital is care and concern for the patients and that
everything which tends to interfere with that objective cannot be tolerated. A
religious choir singing in a hospital chapel may well be desirable but if that
interferes with patient care, it cannot be allowed.
Id. The Court has also addressed the special nature of the medical clinic environment in Beth
Israel Hasp., which dealt with the same issues:
Hospitals, after all, are not factories or mines or assembly plants. They are
hospitals, where human ailments are treated, where patients and relatives alike
often are under emotional strain and worry, where pleasing and comforting
patients are principal facets of the day's activity, and where the patient and his
family . need a restful, uncluttered, relaxing, and helpful atmosphere, rather
than one remindful of the tensions of the marketplace in addition to the tensions
of the sickbed.
437 U.S. at 509 (Blackmun, J., concurring).
166 613 F. Supp. 656, 666 (D.C. Pa. 1985).
176 Id,
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ing, the court acknowledged a declaration by the Pennsylvania De-
partment of Health in 1980 that patient care might suffer as a result
of the harassment of physicians and abortion clinics. Asserting a
significant interest in preventing such harm to women seeking abor-
tions, which it considered a particularized medical service, the court
issued an injunction against enforcement of a disclosure require-
ment of a Pennsylvania Abortion Control Act."
The interest in preventing disruptive and potentially harmful
conduct at medical clinics was asserted again in the 1988 case of
Portland Feminist Women's Health Center v. Advocates For Life, which
revolved around pro-life demonstrations at an abortion clinic.'"
There, the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit
upheld a place and manner injunction, with a slight modification,
on the basis of a significant governmental interest "in protecting
the ability of {a] clinic to provide medical services free from inter-
ference that may endanger the health and safety of its patients.""s
The trial court had sculpted the initial injunction after finding that
the demonstrators often crowded around the entrance of the clinic,
threatening patients and staff, sometimes inches from their faces,
as they entered and exited the clinic; that they grabbed and pushed
people wishing to enter the clinic in an attempt to impede passage;
171 Id. at 672. Provisions of the Pennsylvania Abortion Control Act would have authorized
public disclosure of information that abortion providers had to file with the state. Such
information included the names and addresses of abortion facilities, the number of abortions
performed, and the trimesters in which they were performed. Id. at 659.
"2 859 F.2d 681, 686 (9th Cir. 1988).
'" Id, at 686. The district court's injunction, which was slightly modified by the Court
of Appeals (see supra note 120 and accompanying text), stated:
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that defendants, their agents, servants, em-
ployees, and all persons, groups, and organizations acting in concert with one
or more of the defendants are hereby enjoined from committing any of the
following acts:
I. obstructing the free and direct passage of any person in or out of the
Portland Feminist Women's Health Center (the Center);
2. demonstrating or distributing literature on the Foster Road sidewalk in
front of the Center in a rectangular zone that extends from the Center's front
door to the curb and twelve and one-half feet on either side of a line from the
middle of the Center's door to the curb;
3. shouting, screaming, chanting, or yelling during on-site demonstrations;
4. producing noise by any other means which substantially interferes with
the provision of medical services within the Center, including counseling;
5. trespassing on Center property;
6. damaging the property of the Center, its employees or clients; and
7. interfering with the Center's receipt of public utility services.
This Order shall remain in effect until further order of the court.
Id. at 684.
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and that they chanted, shouted, and screamed from the sidewalk
alongside the clinic in a manner intended to be and, in fact, was
heard inside the clinic, where medical procedures were per-
formed.' 74 The trial court had further found that the noise and
intimidation of the demonstrations hindered the provision of med-
ical care in the clinic, upset the clients, and increased the risk of
medical complications and injuries.' 75
Examining the provisions of the district court's injunction, the
Court of Appeals held that the creation of a "free zone" extending
twelve-and-a-half feet to the right and the left of the front door
and from the front door to the curb was narrowly tailored "to
address threats, intimidation, and assault of clinic personnel and
clients that impede the safe provision of medical care." 176 In mod-
ifying the injunction's provision that prohibited shouting, scream-
ing, chanting, yelling, and producing noise, the appellate court
sought to restrict only that conduct that substantially interfered with
the provision of medical services.'" The court recognized the im-
portant governmental interest in preserving a clinic environment
conducive to medical services, and essentially upheld, with some
modification, a narrowly tailored injunction to effectuate that inter-
est.
In the 1989 case of Medlin v. Palmer, the Court of Appeals for
the Fifth Circuit asserted a similar governmental interest when it
upheld a Dallas city ordinance prohibiting the use of amplified
sound near certain medical and educational facilities. 178 In Medlin,
three abortion protestors filed suit against the city after being ar-
174 Id. at 683.
175 Id.
' 76 Id. at 686.
177 Id. at 686-87. Carefully considering the nexus between the stated governmental
interest and the trial court's tailoring of the injunction, the appellate court stated:
Chanting, shouting, screaming, or yelling, may be an expressive, albeit unpleas-
ant, form of behavior. If it causes no disruption of clinic operations, such
expression would not materially affect the interest at stake here. On the other
hand, if the conduct rises to a volume that obstructs the provision of services
in the Center, it may be enjoined.
Id. at 686-87. The Court of Appeals modified the district court's injunction in the following
manner. It deleted provisions 3 and 4, see supra note 173 for the full text, and inserted the
following provision which prohibited protestors from:
3. shouting, screaming, chanting, yelling, or producing noise by any other
means, in a volume that substantially interferes with the provision of medical
services within the Center, including counseling;
Id. at 687. The remainder of the injunction was not contested. Id.
178 874 F.2d 1085, 1086, 1090 (5th Cir. 1989).
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rested for using bullhorns outside abortion clinics in violation of
the ordinance, claiming that it unconstitutionally violated their first
amendment rights.' 79 After finding that the ordinance had satisfied
the other requisites of restrictions on free speech in that it was
content-neutral and left available ample alternative channels of
communication, the appellate court stated that the ordinance, in
this context, was also tailored to serve a legitimate governmental
interest in protecting patients of medical clinics from the intrusion
of noise generated by pro-life activists.' 8° The court, in finding the
ordinance constitutional, asserted a state interest in protecting clin-
ical environments in order to enable them to be conducive to med-
ical treatment and convalescence.'"
Similarly, in the 1989 case of State v. Migliorino, the Supreme
Court of Wisconsin upheld the constitutionality of a state statute
that prohibited people from entering medical facilities under cir-
cumstances tending to disturb the peace.'" Migliorino involved two
separate cases of criminal trespass of medical facilities that had been
consolidated for resolution of the issue of constitutionality. 183 In the
first case, defendants had been arrested for violation of the statute
after they entered an abortion clinic without permission and began
disturbing people in the waiting room by talking to them and dis-
tributing literature.' 84
In the companion case, defendants had been arrested after
they entered a building that housed an abortion clinic and disrupted
the clinic's operations; some protestors had blocked entry to the
facility's treatment rooms, while others handcuffed themselves to
furniture.' 83 In upholding the constitutionality of the statute, the
court examined the purposes of medical facilities and the circum-
' Id. at 1087-88.
188
 Id. at 1090.
i'L Id.
183
 150 Wis. 2d 513, 530, 442 N.W.2d 36, 43, cert. denied sub nom. Haines v. Wisconsin,
110 S. Ct. 565 (1989). Section 943.145 of the Wisconsin Statutes provides in relevant part:
943.145 Criminal trespass to a medical facility. (1) In this section, "medical facility" means a
hospital under s. 50.33(2) or a clinic or office that is used by a physician licensed under ch.
448 and that is subject to rules promulgated by the medical examining board for the clinic
or office that are in effect on November 20, 1985. (2) Whoever intentionally enters a medical
facility without the consent of some person lawfully upon the premises, under circumstances
tending to create or provoke a breach of the peace, is guilty of a Class Pt misdemeanor. Wis.
STAT. ANN. § 943,145 (1990).
183 Migliorino, 150 Wis. 2d at 516, 442 N.W.2d at 37.
'84 Id. at 518-19, 442 N.W.2d at 38.
183 Id. at 520-21, 442 N.W.2d at 39.
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stances surrounding them.' 86 The court noted that any medical
consultation, treatment, or procedure was a personal and private
activity, which created substantial apprehension and tension under
even the most optimum circumstances. Given the considerations
attendant to medical treatment, the court stated that no patient
should be subjected to conduct tending to disrupt the peace. Be-
cause the statute prohibited such conduct, the court asserted that it
furthered significant state interests in privacy, health, property, and
security, and upheld the statute.' 87 Thus, both the Migliorino and
the Medlin courts, in upholding the constitutionality of restrictions
on expressive conduct, recognized a state interest in protecting
clinics from conduct tending to disrupt its operations and posing a
threat of harm to its patients.
In O.B.G.Y.N. Associations v. Birthright of Brooklyn and Queens,
Inc., a 1978 case, the Supreme Court, Appellate Division of New
York, recognized a similar governmental interest when it modified
a lower court injunction aimed at controlling protestors' disruptive
demonstrations in front of an abortion facility.' 88
 The protestors;
the trial court found, had demonstrated and picketed around the
clinic on several occasions, chanting, distributing messages and
carrying signs claiming abortion to be murder.' 89
 The trial court
also found that the protestors had blocked' ingress to and egriss
from the clinic and had surrounded patients and other visitors to
the facility. As a result of the protestors' actions, the trial court
found, many patients had entered the premises crying and visibly
upset, causing delays and rescheduling of appointments to the det-
riment of the health and welfare of the patients.' 9°
Based on these findings, the trial court issued an injunction
prohibiting the protestors from engaging in any type of picketing
that would incite disorderly conduct or riots.' 91 On appeal, the
Appellate Division held that parts of the initial injunction were
"vague and overbroad" and retailored it so as to address.the central
governmental interest implicated by the demonstrations: the inter-
est in proscribing conduct that hinders the practice of medicine at
a clinic, and thereby adversely affects the health and welfare of its
' 88 Id. at 528, 442 N.W.2d at 42.
167 Id.
lag
 64 A.D.2d 894, 895-96, 407 N.Y.S.2d 903, 905-06 (N.Y. App. Div. 2d 1978).
' 89 Id. at 894, 407 N.Y.S.2d at 905.
190 Id.
194
 Id.
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patients.' 92 The court clearly placed a premium on the expressive
rights of the protestors and attempted not to prohibit protected
activity, but acknowledged that certain excesses in the protestors'
conduct endangered the health of the clinic patients and therefore
had to be proscribed. Accordingly, the appellate court modified the
trial court's injunction to enjoin the protestors " . . . from any type
of picketing which would incite riot, . . . from barring any person
from entering or exiting [the clinic] and . . . from making any
excessive loud sound which disturbs, injures, or endangers the
health or safety of any patient of the medical clinic." 93
Thus, in addition to significant governmental interests in keep-
ing streets and sidewalks open and available for passage and in
preserving the normal activities of certain places, courts have rec-
ognized a significant governmental interest in protecting clinical
facilities from conduct which disrupts the provision of medical care.
As with the interest in preserving the normal activities of such areas
as schools and courthouses, the recognition of this interest implies
that the importance of the activity undertaken within medical clin-
ics, the provision of patient care, outweighs the first amendment
interests at stake. Courts recognizing this interest in the anti-abor-
tion context acknowledge the importance of the implicated first
amendment interests, but assert that the protection afforded to
expressive conduct does not extend to that conduct which poses a
potential risk of harm to clinic patients.
4. Protecting Unwilling Listeners From Intrusion Into the Privacy
of Their Homes
A fourth governmental interest that the United States Supreme
Court has recognized is that of protecting unwilling listeners from
intrusions into the privacy of their homes.' 94 The Court's willingness
to curtail speech that intrudes into the privacy of the home derives
from a traditional interest in preserving the sanctity of the home.t 95
In the 1988 case of Frisby v. Schultz, the Court upheld a significant
governmental interest in protecting residential privacy as a basis for
192 Id. at 895, 407 N.Y.S.2d at 905.
1" M. at 894, 407 N.Y.S.2d at 905.
194 See, e.g., Frisby v. Schultz, 487 U.S. 474, 484 (1988) (picketing outside home); FCC
v. Pacifica Found., 438 U.S. 726, 748 (1978) (offensive radio broadcasts); Rowan v. Post
Office Dept., 397 U.S. 728, 738 (1970) (unsolicited offensive mail); Kovacs v. Cooper, 336
U.S. 77, 86-87 (1949) (sound trucks).
See Frisby, 487 U.S. at 484; Carey v. Brown, 447 U.S. 455, 471 (1980); Gregory v.
Chicago, 394 U.S. 111, 125 (1969).
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restrictions on expression.'" In Frisby, two individuals opposed to
abortion wished to express their views by picketing on a public
street outside the residence of a doctor who performed abortions
at two clinics in neighboring towns. 197 When the Town. Board en-
acted an ordinance restricting all picketing near the residence or
dwelling of any individual in the town, the individuals brought suit
in United States District Court for the Eastern District of Wisconsin,
seeking a preliminary injunction to forbid enforcement of the or-
dinance.'" After the district court granted appellee's motion for
preliminary injunction on the grounds that the ordinance was not
narrowly tailored enough to restrict protected speech in a public
forum, the United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit
affirmed the district court's decision.' 99
The United States Supreme Court reversed the Seventh Cir-
cuit's decision and upheld the validity of the town ordinance.2"
Identifying residential privacy as a significant governmental inter-
est, the Court held that the ordinance was narrowly tailored to
prohibit the "appropriately targeted evil" of picketing a particular
household.2" In upholding as significant the interest in protecting
residential privacy from intrusive expression, the Court discussed
the traditional interest in preserving the sanctity of the home in
conjunction with the interest in protecting unwilling listeners, 202
The Court noted that its prior decisions often have recognized the
unique nature of the home.2" In addition, the Court stated that
1 " 487 U.S. at 484.
' 22 Id. at 476.
128 Id. at 477.
122 Id. at 478. See Schultz v. Frisby, 807 F.2d 1339, 1340 (7th Cir. 1986) (affirmed by a
divided panel); 818 F.2d 1284, 1284 (1987) (vacated and reheard en bane); 822 F.2d 642,
642 (1987) (reaffirmed by an equally divided vote).
200 Frisk- ,uy 487 U.S. at 488.
"' Id. at 484.
"2 Id. The Court noted that the ordinance itself stated that the primary purpose of the
ban was to protect and preserve the home through assurance "that members of the com-
munity enjoy in their homes and dwellings a feeling of well-being, tranquility, and privacy."
The Town Board, the Court noted, believed that a ban was necessary based on its determi-
nation that "the practice of picketing before or about residences and dwellings causes emo-
tional disturbance and distress to the occupants ... [and] has as its object the harassing of
such occupants." The Court stated that the town ordinance also evinces a concern for public
safety, noting that picketing obstructs and interferes with "the free use of public sidewalks
and public ways of travel." Id. at 477.
233 Id. at 484. The Court stated that "'[t]he State's interest in protecting the well-being,
tranquility, and privacy of the home is certainly of the highest order in a free and civilized
society.'" Id. (quoting Carey v. Brown, 447 U.S. 455, 471 (1980)). The Court also recognized
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individuals may exclude unwanted speech from their own home
and that the government may protect this freedom. 204
Thus, in FrÜby, an anti-abortion protest case, the Court recog-
nized the significant governmental interest of protecting unwilling
listeners from intrusions into the privacy of their homes. The
Court's willingness to curtail speech that intrudes into the privacy
of the home derived from a traditional interest in preserving the
sanctity of the home. Implicit in its reasoning is the Court's belief
that while the first amendment affords protestors the opportunity
to reach their target audience, it does not entitle them to a captive
audience nor does it override the right of individuals to exclude
unwanted speech from their home.
5. Preserving the Right to Abortion
Recent cases addressing abortion protest have also considered
the applicability of a fifth governmental interest, that of preserving
the right to abortion as a valid basis for restrictions on expression. 2°5
In 1986, in Bering v. Share, the Washington Supreme Court upheld
a trial court's injunction, with slight modification, based on the
state's interest in protecting the right to privacy afforded women in
Roe. 206
 After recognizing Roe's right to abortion, the court noted
that "'[p]reserving the sanctity of the home, the one retreat to which men and women can
repair to escape from the tribulations of their daily pursuits, is surely an important value.'"
Id. at 484 (quoting Carey, 447 U.S. at 471).
204 Id. at 485; see also FCC v. Pacifica Found., 438 U.S. 726, 748-49 (1978); Rowan v.
Post Office Dept., 397 U.S. 728, 738 (1970); Kovacs v. Cooper, 336 U.S. 77, 86-87 (1949).
Although the Frisby Court concentrated on the interest in protecting the sanctity of the
home, its analysis also considered a governmental interest in protecting "captive" audiences:
"The first amendment permits the government to prohibit offensive speech as intrusive when
the 'captive audience' cannot avoid the objectionable speech." Frisby, 487 U.S. at 487. But see
Consolidated Edison Co. v. Public Service Comm'n of New York, 447 U.S. 530, 541-42 (1980)
(insertion of controversial policy message in public utility bill not intrusive because customers
could simply throw objectionable material away).
"5 See Lewis v. Pearson Found., 908 F.2d 318, 322 (8th Cir. 1990); see also Bering v.
Share, 106 Wash. 2d 212, 229-30, 721 P.2d 918, 929 (1986), cert. dismissed, 479 U.S. 1050
(1987).
"6
 106 Wash. 2d at 229-30, 721 P.2d at 928-29. The trial court had issued an injunction
prohibiting picketers from:
(1) picketing, demonstrating, or "counseling" at the [clinic], except along the
public sidewalk [to the side of the clinic]; (2) threatening, assaulting, intimidating
or coercing anyone entering or leaving the [clinic]; (3) interfering with ingress
or egress at the building or parking lots to the south or southeast of the
premises; (4) trespassing on the premises; (5) engaging in any unlawful activity
directed at respondent physicians or their patients; (6) referring, in oral state-
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that the ability of a woman to exercise this right depends upon
relatively free access to the services of a licensed physician and upon
the willingness and ability of the physician to provide these ser-
vices. 207 The court was concerned about the potential coercive im-
pact of the picketers upon women seeking an abortion and their
physicians. 208 The court noted that the picketing in question could
be expected to impinge upon a woman's constitutional right of
privacy in two ways. First, due to the coercive impact of the protes-
tors, women seeking abortions might be so affected as to forgo their
rights or to seek to exercise them elsewhere under the care of a
physician not of their choosing; further, the court noted that such
protests might inflict severe psychological damage upon women
seeking to exercise their right to abortion. Second, women would
be denied the opportunity to effectuate their right if continual
harassment caused physicians to refuse to perform legal abortions
for women. The court then noted its own historical commitment to
personal privacy and held that protection of the right to abortion,
even from private invasion, constitutes a compelling state interest
justifying a reasonable restriction on picketing. 208
In the 1990 case of Lewis v. Pearson Foundation, Inc., the United
States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit also recognized a
governmental interest in protecting the right to abortion, even from
private interference. 210 The Court of Appeals in Lewis reversed the
district court's dismissal of the case and remanded it for further
proceedings, holding that a conspiracy to prevent abortion was
actionable under a civil rights conspiracy statute without requiring
a showing of state action.2 " In this case, the plaintiff Lewis was late
in her first trimester of pregnancy and wanted an abortion. 212 She
sought services at a clinic, the "AAA Pregnancy Problem Center,"
whose advertisement was in the Yellow Pages directory under
ments while at the picket site, to physicians or patients, staff, or clients as
"murdering" or "murderers", "killing" or "killers"; or to children or babies as
being "killed" or "murdered" by anyone in the [clinic].
Id. at 219, 721 P.2d at 923-24. The Supreme Court of Washington remanded the case to
the trial court only to narrow the ban on the proscribed language, so that it would apply
only to instances when children were present at the picket site. Id. at 245-46, 721 P.2d at
937-38.
242 It at 227-28, 721 P.2d at 927-28.
2°8 Id. at 228, 721 P.2d at 928.
2°9 Id. at 229-30, 721 P.2d at 929.
"G 908 F.2d 318, 322 (8th Cir. 1990).
2 " Id. at 322, 326.
212 Id. at 319.
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"Abortion Information and Services." When she discovered that the
Center was a "mock" abortion clinic, run by persons opposed to
abortion,. she brought an action in the United States District Court
for the District of Missouri. She alleged that she was injured by a
private conspiracy in which the staff of the Center visited a "lacer-
ating psychological attack" upon her in an attempt to prevent her
and others like her from carrying out the decision to have an
abortion. 2 " The district court dismissed the case, finding that Lewis
had not shown that the defendants possessed the class-based, invid-
iously discriminatory animus required by the civil rights conspiracy
statute. 214
The Court of Appeals, reversing the trial court's decision, be-
gan its analysis by recognizing the continuing viability of Roe v.
Wade. 215. In discussing whether the right to abortion illuminated in
Roe necessitated an allegation of state interference under the civil
rights conspiracy statute, the court noted the United States Supreme
Court's recognition of the fundamental nature of the right. 216 The
2 ' 3 Id. at 318-19. When Lewis called the Center asking about an abortion, a staff member
at the Center assured her they would "help her all they could," and invited her to Con -le in
and take a free pregnancy test. Id. at 319. When she arrived for her appointment, she was
directed to produce a urine sample for a pregnancy test. Lewis was then ushered into a room
where a staff member activated a slide presentation. "The color slides depicted scenes which
were said to illustrate the abortion process. These included pictures of dismembered fetuses
and abortions being performed by means of crude-appearing instruments.' The slide show
also contained intermittent family scenes." Id.
After viewing the slides, Lewis alleged she confronted the staff member, with her feelings
of anger, anxiety, and distress. After the staff member suggested she rely on her religious
faith, Lewis insisted that she still Wanted an abortion. The staff 'flambe; finally offered to
arrange an appointment with a respectable doctor, and, after leaving the room, returned
with a note indicating that Lewis had an appointment with a doctor at St. John's Mercy
Medical Center. Id.
When Lewis arrived at the hospital on the specified day;
 she discovered it was a Roman
Catholic institution and that its doctors did not perform abortions. She obtained an abortion
elsewhere one week later. About a month later, the staff member from AAA called Lewis,
stating that she had called to find out when the baby was due and to check whether "every-
thing was alright" with Lewis. Lewis asserted that this call upset her greatly, as did the
harassment she experienced at the hands of the center. Id.
2 " Id. The district court held that although section 1985(3) sUpports actions against
private conspiracies, Lewis had not sufficiently alleged that the defendants possessed the
requisite class•based, invidiously, ,discriminatory animus. Id.
215 Id. at.326,320:    
216.. Id. at 321-22. The court noted the proclaniation of the United States Supreme Court
in Thornburgh v. American College of Obstetricians and Gynecologists:
Few decisions are more personal and intimate, more properly private, or more
basic to individual dignity and autonomy, than a woman's decision—with the
guidance of her phySician and within the limits specified in Roe—whether to
end her pregnancy. A woman's right to make this choice freely is fundamental.
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court found support for the Roe decision in the existence of personal
privacy interests and freedom of personal choice in marriage • and
family life in the first, fourth, fifth, ninth, and fourteenth amend-
ments, and noted that "[b]y their nature, these interests would be
meaningless were they to be protected only from interference by
the state."217 Consequently, the court held that the civil rights con-
spiracy statute did not require state action where a plaintiff's claim
is rooted in the fundamental right to choose announced in Roe.218
The court then remanded the case to the district court for a trial
under the conspiracy statute. 219
In sum, Lewis reaffirmed the right to abortion and extended
the protection 'of a federal civil rights conspiracy statute to people
whose right to choose is subject to private interference. 220 Both
Bering and Lewis rely on a significant governmental interest in pro-
tecting the right to abortion, even from private interference. They
conclude that this interest is sufficient to uphold restrictions on
expression if the other requirements are met.
In order for a restriction on expressive conduct to pass consti-
tutional scrutiny, it must. promote a significant governmental or state
interest. The above cases demonstrate that the United States Su-
preme Court has recognized several such interests, including inter-
ests in keeping streets and sidewalks free from obstruction, pre-
serving the normal activity of particular areas, protecting medical
clinics from disruptive conduct, and preserving residential privacy.
Courts have cited each of these interests in addition to an interest
in preserving the right to abortion, in considering restrictions on
expression in the anti-abortion protest context.
C. Narrowly Tailored
In addition to being content-neutral and serving a significant
governmental interest, a constitutional restriction upon free ex-
Any other result, in our view, would protect inadequately a central part of the
sphere of liberty that our law guarantees equally to all.
Id. (quoting Thornburgh, 476 U.S. 747, 772 (1986)).
217
 Id. at 322.
1 '" Id. The court further upheld the claim, however, on the basis that the complaint also
included an allegation that the Attorney General, a state actor, actively participated in the
conspiracy to deprive the plaintiff of the equal protection of the law. Id. at 323. The court
also held that state action is not required under section 1985(3) if the rights at issue give rise
to a private right of action under state law; therefore the right under state law to be free
from intentional infliction of emotional distress constituted an independent basis for the
action under the statute. Id.
2 " Id. at 326.
22°
 Id. at 322.
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pression, whether it is in a statute, ordinance or an injunction, must
also be narrowly drawn so as to serve the state's legitimate interests
without unnecessarily interfering with first amendment free-
doms.22 ' Thus, although an injunction barring all speech might
constitute an unconstitutional prior restraint, a reasonable restric-
tion narrowly tailored to serve a significant governmental interest
does not violate the first amendment. 222 To determine whether the
necessary nexus exists, a court must compare the identified state or
governmental interest with the terms and effect of the injunctive
relief. 225 In the context of abortion protest, a statute, ordinance, or
injunction will be considered "overbroad" if it prohibits the privi-
leged exercise of first amendment rights, as well as illegal activity,
indicating that the restriction is not sufficiently narrowly tailored to
further a significant state interest.
In Bering v. Share, for example, the Washington Supreme Court
stated, with respect to the state's interest in maintaining ingress and
egress, that its injunction prohibiting all picketing on the sidewalk
in front of the abortion clinic, was arguably broader than necessary,
thereby prohibiting peaceful picketing that did not impede ingress
or egress. 224 Focusing upon the state's interest in protecting a wom-
an's constitutional right to privacy from the coercive impact of
picketers in front of the clinic, however, the court held that the
injunction was tailored as narrowly as possible to effect that inter-
est.225
In the 1982 case of Parkmed Co. v. Pro-life Counselling, Inc., the
trial court found that the demonstrations of anti-abortion protestors
substantially interfered with the normal functioning of a health care
facility and enjoined the anti-abortion picketers from blocking the
ingress and egress to the premises, from physically abusing and
harassing people, and from disrupting the normal activities of the
clinic.226 It further enjoined the protestors from demonstrating or
picketing on the steps and plaza area of the clinic. On appeal, the
New York Supreme Court, Appellate Division, struck down this
22 ' See Schaumburg v. Citizens for a Better Env't, 444 U.S. 620, 637 (1980). When
considering whether a particular statute, ordinance, or injunction is too brOad, the United
States Supreme Court has stated that a "clear and precise enactment may . . be overbroad
if in its reach it prohibits constitutionally protected conduct." Grayned v. City of Rockford,
408 U.S. 104, 114 (1972).
"2 Bering v. Share, 106 Wash. 2d 212, 230, 721 P.2d 918, 929 (1986), cert. dismissed, 479
U.S. 1050 (1987).
2" Id.
221 Id. at 232, 721 P.2d at 929.
225 Id., 721 P.2d at 930.
226 91 A.D.2d 551, 552, 457 N.Y.S.2d 27, 29 (N.Y. App. Div. 1982).
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latter portion of the injunction on the ground that it was overly
broad and Unnecessarily restricted peaceful picketing and -dernon-
strating. 227 The appellate court further indicated that the deletion
of the provision. forbidding all demonstrations at the clinic would
more narrowly tailor the injunction in such a way as to continue to
advance the significant , governmental interest in restricting disrup-
tive conduct without overly restricting peaceable protest. 228 .
Thus, in order to restrict free expression, a court must tailor
its restriction in such a way as to demonstrate a nexus between the
stated governmental interest and the effect of the injunction. The
narrow tailoring requirement helps ensure that the restriction does
not proscribe constitutionally protected activity unnecessarily. For
example; an injunction based solely on an interest in keeping side-
walks open for passage would not be narrowly tailored sufficiently
if it also restricted the level of noise generated by protestors. This
requirement also reinforces the importance of the governmental
interest asserted by the court. It indicates that courts will view as
overbroad restrictions that go beyond promoting the stated interest
in order to achieve other unexpressed goals.
D. Alternative Means of Communication
The fourth requirement that a restriction or injunction must
meet in order to be constitutional concerns the first amendment's
protection of the right of every citizen to "reach the minds of willing
listeners and to do so there must be opportunity to win their atten-
tion."229 Under this requirement, a valid injunction restricting dem-
onstrations in a particular place must clearly leave alternative means
of expressing, the protected speech despite the effects of the in-
junction. 230
 Although the first amendment does not afford protes-
tors the right to a captive audience, 23 ' it does guarantee them the
opportunity to win the attention of passersby and engage them in
227 Id.
"g Id. at 551, 553, 457 N.Y.S.2d at 28, 29-30.
22° Heffron v. international Soc'y for Krishna Consciousness, Inc., 452 U.S. 640, 655
(1981) (quoting Kovacs v. Cooper, 336 U.S. 77, 87 (1949)).
25° Heffron, 452 U.S. at 654.
"I See Bering v. Share, 106 Wash. 2d 212, 232, 721 P.2d 918, 930 (1986), cert. dismissed,
479 U.S. 1050 (1987). The United States Supreme Court has plainly stated that the First
amendment does not afford demonstrators "the right to cordon off a street, or entrance to
a public or private building, and allow no one to pass who did not agree to listen to their
exhortations." Cox v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 536, 555 (1965).
July 1991]	 ANTI-ABORTION PROTESTS	 873
conversation if they so desire. 232 Courts must therefore ensure that
restrictions on expressive conduct allow for such opportunities. 233
In the 1949 case of Kovacs v. Cooper, for example, the United
States Supreme Court scrutinized an ordinance that prohibited the
use of "sound truck[s]" on public streets to ensure that the ordi-
nance provided citizens with ample alternative means of cornmu-
nication. 234 The Court began its analysis by noting that the first
amendment guarantees every citizen the opportunity to win the
attention and reach the minds of willing listeners. 235 The Court,
however, stated that the right of free speech does not assure people
the opportunity to win the attention of listeners through objection-
ably amplified sound any more than it affords individuals the un-
limited opportunity to address crowds on the streets. 235 The Court
contended that it would be harsh and arbitrary to enforce the first
amendment without regard to the rights of the other citizens af-
fected. 237 The defendant's justification that he could reach people
more easily and cheaply by sound trucks was insufficient to grant
constitutional protection to what the legislature had reasonably clas-
sified as a nuisance, the Court stated, when alternative means of
publicity were available. 238 The Court noted that although the or-
dinance prohibited sound trucks from broadcasting in a loud and
raucous manner on the streets, it did not restrict the communication
of ideas or discussion of issues by the human voice, by newspapers,
by pamphlets, or by "dodgers." 2" Given the alternative means of
communication that the ordinance did not restrict and the interest .
in protecting citizens from the nuisance caused by sound trucks,
the Court upheld the constitutionality of the ordinance. 240
Similarly, in the 1981 case of Heffron v. International Society for
Krishna Consciousness, Inc., 24 ' the Supreme Court analyzed a restric-
tion on expressive conduct to ensure that it provided ample alter-
native forums of communication. 242 In Heffron, a Krishna religious
232 Bering, 106 Wash. 2d at 232, 721 P.2d at 930.
233 Heffron, 452 U,S. at 654.
"4 336 U.S. 77, 78 ( 1 949).
235 Id. at 87.
296 Id. at 87-88,
237 Id. at 88.
238 Id. at 88-89.
239 Id. at 89.
24o Id.
"' See supra notes 129-35 and accompanying text for a discussion of this case in the
context of the recognition of a state interest in maintaining the orderly movement of crowds.
242 Heffron v. International Sac)/ for Krishna Consciousness, Inc., 452 U.S. 640, 654-
55 (1981).
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organization (ISKCON) had challenged the constitutionality of a
rule prohibiting the sale or distribution at a state fair of any mer-
chandise, including printed or written material, outside of specified
locations. 243 The Court stated that in order for the rule to be a valid
restriction of expressive conduct, alternative forums for the ex-
pression of the Krishnas' protected speech must exist in spite of the
rule's effects. 244 Scrutinizing the application of the rule to ISKCON,
the Court noted that the rule did not prevent ISKCON from prac-
ticing Sankritan anywhere outside the fairgrounds, did not exclude
the organization from the fairgrounds or deny it the right to con-
duct any desired activity at some point within the forum,245 The
Court further stated that ISKCON members were permitted to
mingle with the crowd and orally propogate their views, and that
the organization could have arranged for a booth, which would
have enabled it to sell and distribute literature and distribute funds
from that location within the fairgrounds itself. 246
Given the limited functions of the fair and the combined area
in which it operated, the Court held that the rule provided ISKCON
and other organizations with an adequate means to sell and solicit
on the fairgrounds. 247 Reasoning that the rule did not unnecessarily
limit the opportunity of ISKCON to win the attention of willing
listeners and reach their minds, the Court upheld the rule as a
reasonable restriction of expressive conduct. 248 These cases exem-
plify the United States Supreme Court's insistence that restrictions
on expressive conduct leave available ample alternative means of
communication.
In the anti-abortion protest context, courts have uniformly held
that protestors are not entitled to blockade and effectively shut
down abortion clinics as a means of exercising their right to free
speech. 249 Restrictions on expression in the anti-abortion protest
context, however, must also leave available alternative avenues of
43 Id. at 643-44. ISKCON had asserted that the rule would suppress the practice of
Sankirtan, one of its religious rituals, in which members are enjoined to go into public places
to distribute or sell religious literature and to solicit donations for the support of the Krishna
religion. Id. at 645.
244 Id. at 654.
243 Id. at 654-55.
246 Id. at 655.
247
 Id.
243 Id.
249 See, e.g., New York State Nat'l Org. for Women v. Terry, 886 F.2c1 1339, 1364 (2d
Cir., 1989); Bering v. Share, 106 Wash. 2d 212, 232, 721 P.2d 918, 930 (1986), cert. dismissed,
479 U.S. 1050 (1987).
July 1991]	 ANTI-ABORTION PROTESTS	 875
communication. 25° In Bering v. Share, 25 ' for example, the Washing-
ton Supreme Court expressly recognized the need for ample alter-
native means of communication when it analyzed the validity of an
injunction prohibiting anti-abortion protestors from picketing di-
rectly in front of a medical clinic. 252 The court noted that the
injunction did not prohibit the picketers from protesting anywhere
but on the limited stretch of sidewalk in front of the clinic. 255 Thus,
the court stated, the picketers could still picket at a point clearly
visible and reasonably close to the clinic and the people they wished
to address. 254 The court also noted that anyone who wished to talk
to the picketers had only to walk the short distance to the end of
the block, where the picketers were free to sidewalk counse1. 253 The
court therefore held that the injunction provided an alternative
forum allowing the protestors ample opportunity for communica-
tive activity. 256
Similarly, in Medlin v. Palmer, the United States Court of Ap-
peals for the Fifth Circuit scrutinized an ordinance that prohibited
the use of any hand-held amplifier within 150 feet of an abortion
facility to ensure that alternative means of communication ex-
isted.257 The protestors challenging the constitutionality of the or-
dinance alleged that the ordinance unreasonably restricted alter-
native methods of communication. In particular, the protestors
argued that they would have been unable to reach significant por-
tions of their desired audience without use of bullhorns because of
the physical configurations of targeted clinics and adjacent side-
walks. The court stated that the ordinance did not prohibit unam-
plified speech, the distribution of written material, the display of
signs and placards, nor any symbolic speech. Thus, the court held
that although the ordinance prevented the use of amplified sound
near clinics, it did not unreasonably impinge upon alternative meth-
ods of communication. 258
25° See, e.g., Medlin v. Palmer, 874 F.2d 1085, 1090 (5th Cir. 1989); Chico Feminist
Women's Health Center v. Scully, 208 Cal. App. 3d 230, 243, 256 Cal. Rptr. 194, 201 (1989);
Bering, 106 Wash. at 232, 721 P.2d at 930.
251 See supra notes 206-09 and accompanying text for a discussion of Bering on the
governmental interest in preserving the right to abortion.
252 Bering, 106 Wash. 2d at 232, 721 P.2d at 930.
2" Id.
254 Id. at 232-33, 721 P.2d at 930-31.
255 Id. at 233, 721 P.2d at 931.
256 Id.
257 Medlin v. Palmer, 874 F : 2d 1085, 1090 (5th Cir. 1989).
255 Id.
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In contrast, in the 1989 case of Chico Feminist Women's Health
Center v. Scully, a California state appellate court refused to grant
an abortion clinic's motion to amend a preliminary injunction so as
to bar anti-abortion protestors from the vicinity of the clinic on
Saturdays, the only days on which abortions were performed. 259
 In
Chico Feminist Women's Health Center, an abortion clinic was subject
to harassment by anti-abortion picketers on Saturdays, when abor-
tions were performed. 26° As clients arrived at the clinic, they were
forced to pass through or around the picketers in order to enter
the clinic. The protestors would shout at the clients, thrust pam-
phlets. upon them, try to stop them on the sidewalk, photograph
them, and record their vehicle license plate numbers.
The clinic sought and was granted a preliminary injunction
prohibiting the picketers from, among other things, photographing
clients entering or leaving the clinic, obstructing passages to the
clinic, recording license plates of clinic visitors, and picketing in a
specified zone directly in front of the clinic. 26 ' A week after the
injunction issued, however, a picketer recognized a client entering
the clinic and called the client's sister who, in turn, telephoned the
clinic and spoke to the client, urging her not to have an abortion. 262
As a result of this breach of client confidentiality and other alleged
incidents, the clinic motioned to amend the preliminary injunction
to prohibit picketing at the clinic from 8 a.m. until 5 p.m. on
Saturdays. Although the trial court amended the injunction to pro-
hibit the picketers from identifying or disclosing the identity of
clinic patients, it refused to enjoin all picketing activity on Satur-
days. 263
 The court reasoned that the modification would have un-
duly deprived the protestors of any means of reaching their target
audience. 264
 The clinic then appealed to the California Court of
Appeal to effect the Saturday ban of picketing. 265
The appellate court held that the trial court did not abuse its
discretion in refusing to bar the protestors from the vicinity of the
clinic on Saturdays because the clinic had failed to show that the
picketers had ample alternatives for communicating to their target
259
 208 Cal. App. 3d 230, 248, 256 Cal. Rptr. 194, 204 (1989).
26° Id. at 236, 256 Cal. Rptr. at 196.
261 Id. at 236-38, 256 Cal. Rptr. at 196-97.
262 Id. at 238, 256 Cal. Rptr. at 197.
265
 Id. at 238-39, 256 Cal. Rptr. at 198.
264 Id. at 246, 256 Cal. Rptr. at 202-03.
265 Id.
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audience. 266 The court stated that ample alternative channels of
communication do not exist if a speaker's target audience is• alto-
gether insulated from the speaker's message. 257 The court pointed
to the fact that abortions were only performed on Saturdays, and
stated that the clinic had made no showing that the picketers had
any means of reaching their target audience if they were excluded
from the area of the clinic on Saturdays.
• These cases show that although the first amendment does not
necessarily afford protestors the right to the most effective means
of communication available nor the right to a captive audience, it
does guarantee them the opportunity to win the attention and reach
- the minds of willing listeners. Thus, restrictions on expressive con-
duct must leave open ample alternative means of communication.
Courts will generally not invalidate restrictions on these grounds
unless the restrictions insulate the target audience from the protes-
tors' message altogether, thereby precluding the protestors' ability
to win their attention.
E. Vagueness
Finally, in addition to the four requirements set forth above,
courts, in considering possible restrictions on expression, must also
ensure that the injunction or statute at issue is not unconstitutionally
vague. 268 The courts' standard for vagueness is if the injunction or
statute either forbids or requires an activity in terms so vague "that
men of common intelligence must necessarily guess at its meaning
and differ as to its application." 269 The purpose of the vagueness
doctrine is to ensure that all people are informed as to what the
State commands or forbids so they can conduct themselves in con-
formity with that law. 27° The prohibition against overly vague laws
protects people from voluntarily having to curtail activities that,
although protected by the first amendment, may be confused with
illegal activity due to an unconstitutionally vague statute. 27 ' When
166 Id. at 243, 256 Cal. Rptr. at 201.
267 Id. at 246, 256 Cal. Rptr. at 203.
see See Grayned v. City of Rockford, 408 U.S. 104, 108 (1972).
269 See Planned Parenthood v. Operation Rescue, 406 Mass. 701, 714, 550 N.E.2d 1361,
1369 (1990) (quoting Connally v. General Constr. Co., 269 U.S. 385, 391 (1926)).
2" Lanzetta v. New Jersey, 306 U.S. 451, 453 (1939); see also Planned Parenthood, 406
Mass, at 714, 550 N.E.2d at 1369.
221 See Grayned, 408 U.S. at 109.
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making a determination of vagueness, courts must consider the
statute or injunction within the factual context to which it applies. 272
In the 1972 case of Grayned v. Rockford, the United States Su-
preme Court held that a town ordinance that criminalized willful
noise or diversion that disturbed or tended to disturb the peace or
good order of any school in session, was not unconstitutionally
vague. 273 The ordinance did not specify the prohibited level of
disturbance, but the Court found that, given its purpose of pro-
tecting the school environment, this level was whether normal
school activity had been or was about to be disrupted. 274 The Court
rejected a challenge to the vagueness of the words "noise" and
"diversions" by noting the requirements of the ordinance that the
"noise or diversion" be actually incompatible with normal school
activity; that a demonstrated causal relationship exist between the
"noise or diversion" and the disruption; and that the acts be done
willfully. 275 Given these requirements and the particularized school
context, the Court held that the ordinance gave fair notice to those
to whom it was directed, thus withstanding constitutional scrutiny. 276
Therefore, so long as the restriction gives the person of ordi-
nary intelligence a reasonable opportunity to know what is prohib-
ited, so that he or she may act accordingly, it should withstand
constitutional scrutiny."' When making this determination, courts
will consider the statute or injunction within the factual context to
which it applies. The prohibition of vagueness attempts to avoid
the situation in which an unconstitutionally vague statute causes a
person to refrain from permissible activity due to the fact that it
might be confused with illegal activity.
In sum, in order to balance the two constitutionally protected
rights, the right to free speech and the right to abortion, statutes
and court injunctions restricting expression must meet several re-
quirements. First, they must be content-neutral. Second, they must
further a significant governmental interest. Significant governmen-
tal interests include keeping streets and sidewalks free from obstruc-
tion, preserving the normal activity of particular areas, protecting
medical health environments, preserving residential privacy, and
972 See Planned Parenthood, 406 Mass. at 715, 550 N.E.2d at 1369.
2" Grayned, 408 U.S. at 107-08.
274
 Id. at 112.
273 Id. at 113-14.
2" Id. at 112 (quoting American Communications Ass'n v. Douds, 359 U.S. 382, 412
(1950)).
477 Id. at 108.
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preserving the right to abortion. 278 Third, they must be narrowly
drawn. Fourth, they must provide ample alternatives for free ex-
pression. Lastly, they must not be unconstitutionally vague. 279
III. DIFFERING APPROACHES IN RECENT ANTI-ABORTION PROTEST
CASES
In recent years, a number of cases concerning abortion protests
have challenged restrictions on expressive conduct and the requisite
governmental interests necessary to support such restrictions. 28°
The following three 1990 cases illustrate the interplay of the con-
stitutional requirements on restrictions of free speech within the
abortion protest context.
In the 1990 case of Eanes v. State, Maryland's highest court, the
Court of Appeals of Maryland, upheld the constitutionality of a
state statute limiting the volume level of speech. 28 ' In doing so, the
court stated that the statute satisfied the requirements for consti-
tutional restraints on expression and that it advanced a substantial
governmental interest in protecting its citizens from unwelcome
noise.282 The case arose from an anti-abortion demonstration that
took place in front of an abortion clinic located on a congested
street. 283 Petitioner's primary method of demonstration was "to
preach the gospel of Jesus Christ," which he did, unaided by arti-
ficial amplification for short periods of time during the day. 284 After
the police received a number of noise complaints from local resi-
272 See, e.g., Frisby v. Schultz, 489 U.S. 474, 484 (1988) (interest in residential privacy);
New York State Nat'l Org. for Women v. Terry, 886 F.2d 1359, 1364 (2d Cir. 1989) (interest
in maintaining safety, controlling traffic on the streets and sidewalks of an urban environ-
ment), cert. denied, 110 S. Ct. 2206 (1990); Portland Feminist Women's Health Center v.
Advocates for Life, 859 F.2d 681, 686 (9th Cir. 1988) (interest in protecting medical clinic
from disruptive conduct); Bering v. Share, 106 Wash. 2d 212, 229-30, 721 P.2d 918, 929
(1986) (interest in protecting right to privacy), cert. dismissed, 479 U.S. 1050 (1987).
275 See United States v. Grace, 461 U.S. 171, 177 (1983); Crayned, 408 U.S. at 108-09.
225 See, e.g., Planned Parenthood v. Operation Rescue, 406 Mass. 701, 702-03, 550
N.E.2d 1361, 1363 (1990); Eanes v. State, 318 Md. 436, 458, 468, 569 A.2d 604, 615, 620,
cert. denied, 110 S. Ct. 3218 (1990); Planned Parenthood v. Project Jericho, 52 Ohio St. 3d
56, 59-60, 556 N.E.2d 157, 161-62 (1990).
251 318 Md. at 458, 468, 569 A.2d at 615, 620.
222 Id. at 449, 458, 569 A.2d at 610, 615.
225 Id. at 441, 569 A.2d at 606.
224 Id. The court noted that preaching on the public street was Eanes' only activity on
the day in question. There was no suggestion that he made any effort to restrain physically
anyone who attempted to enter the clinic or that he tried to block access to the clinic. Nor
was there any contention that he threatened anyone with physical violence or that he tres-
passed on private property. He did not attempt to incite his listeners to violence, use profanity
or obscenity, or hurl "fighting words" at his listeners. Id. at 441 n.2, 569 A.2d at 606 n. 2.
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dents and people employed in the area, an officer informed Eanes
about the complaints and warned him , to reduce the volume level
of his speech. 285 •After receiving further noise complaints, the officer
returned to find Eanes shouting in a loud voice; he then arrested
Eanes'for disturbing- the-peace in violation of Maryland law. 286
- The Washington County District Court found Eanes guilty of
disturbing the peace, as did the Circuit Court for Washington
County in a de novo review of his conviction. 287 Eanes appealed to
the Maryland Court of Appeals, claiming that the Maryland statute
unconstitutionally infringed upon his first amendment rights. 288
The Court of Appeals affirmed the circuit court's decision, holding
that it had properly balanced Eanes' first amendment rights against
the substantial public interest in freedom from unwanted noise,
which was protected by a narrowly drawn, content-neutral regula-
tion.289 Analyzing the ordinance in light of the standards set for
restrictions of speech in traditional public forums, and noting that
the statute was conceded to be content-neutral and to provide ample
alternative avenues of communication, the court centered its dis-
cussion on whether the ordinance was narrowly tailored to serve a
substantial governmental interest. 290
The court started its analysis by discussing the United States
Supreme Court's recognition of a governmental interest in protect-
ing its citizens from unwelcome noise. 29 ' The court noted a judicial
concern with balancing the protestor's right of free speech with the
public's right to be free from unwanted communication, particularly
if the public is made a "captive audience." 292 The court acknowl-
"9 Id. at 442, 569 A.2d at 606.
2 (46 Id. The Maryland Code makes it unlawful for anyone to "wilfully disturb any neigh-
borhood in [any Maryland] city, town or county by loud and unseemly noises . . . ." Mo.
ANN. CODE art. 27, § 121 (1957).
" 7 Eanes, 318 Md. at 442-43, 569 A.2d at 607.
"9 Id. at 443, 569 A.2d at 607.
999 Id. at 468, 569 A.2d at 620.
29° Id. at 446, 448-49, 458, 569 A.2d at 609-10, 614. The court noted that "filln this
case even Eanes does not question that as applied to protected speech, § 121 can be read as
content neutral." Id. at 448, 569 A.2d at 609-10.
Nothing in the statute prevents a speaker from orally addressing passersby, or from
distributing literature or carrying signs expressing his or her viewpoint. Id. at 458, 569 A.2d
at 614-15. Also, the court noted, if the speaker wishes to reach area residents or merchants,
he or she could communicate with willing recipients by telephone, postal service, or in person.
Id. at 458, 569 A.2d at 615.
291 Id. at 449, 569 A.2d at 610 (citing Ward v. Rock Against Racism, 109 S. Ct. 2746,
2756 (1989); Sala v. New York, 334 U.S. 558, 562 (1948); Reeves v. McConn, 631 F.2d 377,
382 (5th Cir. 1980)).
"2 Id. at 451, 569 A.2d at 611. The notion of "captive audience" involves the problem
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edged that the Supreme Court has permitted states to protect lis-
teners who are "captive" to unwanted speech when that speech
invades their privacy interest in an essentially intolerable manner. 293
The Maryland Court of Appeals stated that, although such protec-
tion is most often extended to those within their homes, it may also
be extended whenever individuals are unable to escape a "bom-
bardment of [their] sensibilities" that threatens their privacy inter-
ests. 294
 Describing sound as one of the most intrusive means of
communication, the court held that the statute was narrowly tailored
to serve a substantial governmental interest because it prohibits only
communication of such a volume that it unreasonably disturbs in-
dividuals whose rights to be free from such sound override the right
of a speaker to address them orally. 295
Although the majority opinion in Eanes extended the captive
audience doctrine beyond the realm of the home, a dissenting jus-
tice strongly objected to such extension. 296
 His lengthy dissent
pointed out that the holding prohibited an activity that would seem
most protected by the first amendment: luinamplified speech, on
a public sidewalk in a commercial area, about a controversial polit-
ical and social topic."297
 The dissent stressed that this speech was
the defendant's only activity: there had been no evidence that he
had trespassed on clinic property, threatened anyone, used obscen-
ity or fighting words, disrupted any medical procedures, or tried to
block access to the clinic. 2" Focusing on this speech, the dissent
noted the special protection historically given free speech, particu-
larly in such public forums as sidewalks, and argued that the ma-
jority's opinion unduly narrowed protected speech to that which
cannot be heard over surrounding traffic noise and that which does
of an unwilling listener or viewer who cannot readily escape from the undesired communi-
cation, or whose own rights are such that he or she should not be required to do so. Id.
(citing Haiman, Speech v. Privacy: Is There A Right Not To Be Spoken To?, 67 Nw. U.L. Rev.
153, 195-97 (1972)).
295
	 at 452, 569 A.2d at 612 (citing Note, Too Close For Comfort: Protesting Outside
Medical Facilities, 101 HARV. L. REV. [856, 1863 (1988)). The note analyzes a Boulder,
Colorado "bubble zone ordinance" which established 100•foot buffer zone around entrances
to licensed medical facilities.
291 Id. at 452-53, 569 A.2d at 612 (quoting Cohen v. California, 403 U.S. 15, 24 (1971)).
292 Id. at 453, 569 A.2d at 612,
29" Id. at 472, 569 A.2d at 621 (Eldridge, J., dissenting).
vm Id. at 472-73, 569 A.2d at 622 (Eldridge, J„ dissenting). According to the dissent,
Eanes was engaged in free speech in its "most pristine and classic form." Id. at 472, 569 A.2d
at 622 (Eldridge, J., dissenting) (quoting Edwards v. South Carolina, 372 U.S. 229, 235
(1963)).
292 Id. at 472-73, 569 A.2d at 622 (Eldridge, J., dissenting).
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not disturb even sensitive individuals. 299 The dissent asserted that
the majority was insensitive to free speech rights in its condemnation
of noise as one of the most intrusive means of communication,
overlooking the fact that sound, in the form of the spoken word, is
the most basic thing protected by the first amendment."G The ma-
jority's opinion, the dissent suggested, also provides a means of
suppressing unpopular or unusual speech by means of complaints
aimed ostensibly at limiting sound level."'
The dissent then argued that the statute met none of the re-
quirements validating restrictions under the first amendment. 502
First, it argued that the statute was not content-neutral in that it
gave complainants and police authorities a weapon that they could
use to suppress speech because of its content or the identity of its
speaker, a weapon that would rarely be used to restrict "acceptable"
speeches by prominent persons. 303 Striking at the majority's reliance
on a governmental interest in protecting its citizens from unwel-
come noise, the dissent noted that the Supreme Court had never
upheld an interest in controlling the volume of unamplified political
speech, delivered at an appropriate time and place. 304 Analyzing
the cases relied upon by the majority to support this interest, the
dissent pointed to the clear distinction that the Supreme Court has
drawn between amplified sound and unamplified speech, asserting
that these cases prohibit authorities from invoking general disor-
derly conduct statutes to suppress speech simply because it is
noisy."'
The dissent conceded that the interest in protecting citizens
from unwelcome noise might justify narrowly drawn time, place,
and manner regulations of noise, but that no such regulations were
299 Id. at 473-74, 569 A.2d at 622 (Eldridge, J., dissenting). The dissent contended that
the majority placed too much emphasis on testimony that an adult and a child were unable
to sleep during the day, and that sonic workers nearby had difficulty concentrating on their
work as a result of Eanes' protest. It emphasized the fact that the speech was not delivered
in a residential neighborhood and was not delivered at a time when most people are sleeping,
indicating that the scope of the first amendment should not be dependent upon the sensi-
bilities of sensitive individuals. Id.
"° Id. at 476, 569 A.2d at 624 (Eldridge, J., dissenting) (citing Texas v. Johnson, 109 S.
Ct. 2533, 2540 (1989)).
39L Id. at 475, 569 A.2d at 623 (Eldridge, J., dissenting). The dissent noted, "lainnoyance
at ideas can be cloaked in annoyance at sound.'" Id. (quoting Saia v. New York, 334 U.S.
558, 562 (1948)).
392 Id. at 478, 569 A.2d at 624-25 (Eldridge, J., dissenting).
"3 Id. at 477-78, 569 A.2d at 624 (Eldridge, J., dissenting).
"4 Id. at 478-79, 569 A.2d at 625 (Eldridge, J., dissenting).
3°5 Id. at 482, 487, 569 A.2d at 627, 629 (Eldridge, J., dissenting).
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applied in this case. 06 The statute did not contain any time or place
restrictions, and the manner restriction was not narrowly drawn,
but vague and overbroad."' The statute, the dissent argued, lacked
the objective specificity of the restrictions on sound, such as the
Court found in the Grayned case, which had express time and place
limitations, and a specific manner limitation—actual interference
with operations of the schoo1.308
The dissent further contended that the words "loud and un-
seemly" were open to such flexible interpretation that a person
planning to make a speech would not know in advance whether his
or her activity would be a crime, and that therefore, constitutionally
protected activity could be prohibited by the statute. 309 The dissent
found unpersuasive the majority's argument that its application of
the statute allowed for ample alternative avenues of communication
in that it required individuals to forgo the most basic form of free
speech and to choose less direct means. The dissent concluded that
the majority's decision distorted basic constitutional guarantees and
presented great potential danger to individuals speaking on contro-
versial topics."°
In another 1990 case, Planned Parenthood v. Operation Rescue,
the Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts reinstated a lower
court's injunction ordering anti-abortion advocates to refrain from
obstructing access to specified abortion clinics."' The case arose out
of protests at the plaintiffs' clinics in which the defendant anti-
abortion groups sought to stop abortions by blocking entranceways
and lobbies of the clinic, thereby preventing patients and staff from
entering or leaving. 3 ' 2 The plaintiffs brought a class action in the
306 Id. at 487, 569 A.2d at 629 (Eldridge, J., dissenting).
3°7 Id.
3G° Id. at 487-88, 569 A.2d at 629 (Eldridge, J., dissenting). The dissent noted in a
footnote that the court in Portland Feminist Women's Health Center v. Advocates For Life, Inc.
had modified an injunction to forbid a volume interfering with the provision of medical care
in an abortion clinic, but added once again that Eanes' speech had not been found to have
interfered with medical services at the clinic. Id. at 488 n.7, 569 A.2d at 629 n.7 (Eldridge,
J., dissenting) (citing 859 F.2d 681, 684 (9th Cir. 1988)).
509 Id, at 489, 491, 569 A.2d at 630, 631 (Eldridge, J., dissenting). The dissent also
argued that the vagueness of the statute violated the basic principles of due process found
in the fourteenth amendment and Article 24 of the Maryland Declaration of Rights. Id. at
493, 569 A.2d at 632 (Eldridge, J., dissenting).
310 Id. at 492, 500, 569 A.2d at 631-32, 635-36 (Eldridge, J., dissenting).
3 " 406 Mass. 701, 702-03, 550 N.E.2d 1361, 1363 (1990).
312 Id. at 703-04, 550 N.E.2d at 1363. The court noted that one demonstrator chained
herself to a clinic door, and another chained himself to a toilet in a clinic. Id. at 704, 550
N.E.2d at 1363. Police efforts to clear the entranceways were often unsuccessful because as
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trial court on behalf of themselves and those who might seek to
obtain services at the plaintiffs' clinics, seeking immediate injunctive
relief to prevent the protestors from blockading the clinics and from
threatening, intimidating and coercing the clinics' patients and
staff." 5
The trial court judge granted the plaintiffs' motion for a pre-
liminary injunction." 4 The Appeals Court denied the defendant's
petition seeking relief from the injunction, but on further appeal,
a single justice in the Supreme Judicial Court suspended the pre-
liminary injunction until further order of the court or final dispo-
sition of the case. 515 On appeal of the decision of the single justice
to the full court, the Supreme Judicial Court, subsequently rein-
stated the trial court's preliminary injunction, holding that it was
content-neutral, narrowly tailored to advance a significant state in-
terest, reasonably specific, and allowed ample alternative methods
of communication. 516 The court affirmed a significant state interest
in protecting people from irreparable harm, which would result
police moved people away from entrances, other protestors would move in to fill the vacancy.
Id., 550 N.E.2d at 1364. Further, those who were removed would return to their original
positions upon their release by the police. The defendants also sang and chanted during the
protests and engaged in sidewalk counseling in an effort to dissuade people from attempting
to enter the clinics. Id.
313 Id. at 703, 550 N.E.2d at 1363. The plaintiffs charged the defendants with eight
counts of illegal activity arising out of the demonstrations, including violations of the Mas-
sachusetts Civil Rights Act, intentional infliction of emotional distress, intentional interference
with prospective contractual relations, invasion of privacy, false imprisonment, trespass,
nuisance, and conspiracy. Id.
3 " Id. at 705, 550 N.E.2d at 1364. The preliminary injunction stated:
After hearing, and after consideration of arguments of counsel and review of the affidavits
and memoranda filed, the Court, finding irreparable harm and probability of success on the
merits, and balancing the interests involved, hereby ORDERS that the above-named defen-
dants, all of whom have been served, and their agents, servants, employees and those acting
in concert with them are preliminarily enjoined from:
a. trespassing on, blocking, or in any way obstructing access (either ingress
or egress) to the offices or clinics of plaintiff providers of services, and
b. physically restraining or obstructing or committing any acts of force or
violence against persons entering, leaving, working at or seeking to obtain
services from plaintiff providers, until further order of the Court.
Id. at 705 n.5, 550 N.E.2d at 1364 n.5.
315 Id. at 705-06, 550 N.E.2d at 1369.
315 Id. at 716-17, 550 N.E.2d at 1370-71. The injunction, the court stated, "makes no
reference to the specific viewpoints espoused by the defendants or the plaintiffs." Id. at 716,
550 N.E.2d at 1370. Furthermore, the injunction allows the protestors "to express their views
through any number of alternative methods not prohibited by the injunction, such as singing,
lecturing, or peaceful picketing." Id. at 716-17, 550 N.E.2d at 1370.
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from the denial of the right to abortion by the protestors' activi-
ties. 17
The court reasoned'that.the right to abortion is a , substantive
right recognized .under. both the federal and Massachusetts consti-
tutions. 3 "'In addition, the court noted that the right is time-sensitive
and expires only weeks after the onset of pregnancy. 3 " Because the
delay of the ability. to exercise such a right therefore could result
in its denial. altogether, the court decided that the plaintiffs had
satisfied their burden of showing, for the preliminary injunction,
that they.would suffer an irreparable loss of rights that could not
be vindicated, even if they prevailed after a full hearing on the
merits. 520
Rejecting the contention that the injunction was unconstitu-
tionally vague, the Supreme Judicial Court followed the standard
set by the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit,
which had held that an injunction that prohibited the obstruction
of the entrances to a clinic was not overly vague if the terms of the
injunction are reasonably understandable and place the enjoined
parties on fair notice as to the prohibited activity.32 ' The court also
held that the injunction was not overbroad because it only enjoined
the defendants from engaging in conduct that was already illegal,
such as trespassing and obstructing clinic entranceways. 922
A dissenting opinion, however, argued that the plaintiffs did
not have standing to assert the rights of women claiming past in-
terference or threatened future interference with their access to
abortions. 323 The dissent further contended that by prohibiting "ob-
ail
	
at 716, 550 N.E.2d at 1370.
"8 Id. at 707, 550 N.E.2d at 1365 (citing Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 152-53 (1973); Moe
v. Secretary of Admin. & Fin., 382 Mass. 629, 647-48, 417 N.E.2d 387, 398 (1981)).
" 9
 Planned Parenthood, 406 Mass. at 709, 550 N.E.2d at 1366 (quoting Bellotti v. Baird,
443 U.S. 622, 642 (1979)).
52° Id, at 710, 550 N.E.2d at 1367.
32 ' Id. at 715, 550 N.E.2d at 1370 (citing Portland Feminist Women's Health Center, 859
F.2d 681, 685 (9th Cir. '1988)). The court also stated:
In the context of this injunction, given the history of prior protests and the
pending litigation between the plaintiffs and the defendants, the phrase "ob-
structing access" can only be construed as referring to the physical blocking of
access to the clinics, either by demonstrators sitting or lying in entranceways to
prevent patients or staff from entering the clinics, or by the use of inanimate
objects to achieve the same purpose.
Id. at 715, 550 N.E.2d at 1369-70.
32v Id.
5" Id. at 733-34, 550 N.E.2d at 1379-80 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
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structing access" in any way, the injunction is unconstitutionally
vague and overbroad to the extent that it prohibits legal activity. 324
In a third 1990 case, Planned Parenthood v. Project Jericho, the
Supreme Court of Ohio also upheld a trial court injunction that
prohibited anti-abortion protestors from interfering with the op-
eration of an abortion clinic, harassing staff and patients, and block-
ing access to the clinic. 325 The Planned Parenthood Association of
Cincinnati initiated the litigation in response to demonstrations at
one of its clinics, which provided counseling and medical services,
including abortions, to women. 326 The association had.filed a com-
plaint seeking injunctions against Project Jericho and other pro-life
protestors in the trial court, alleging that these protestors disrupted
the operation of the clinic, blocked access to the building, harassed
and intimidated staff and patients, and created traffic problems."'
The trial court issued a preliminary injunction prohibiting the
protestors both from shouting or chanting so loudly as to be heard
inside the clinic and from blocking the sidewalk.328
As consideration of this injunction was pending, Planned Par-
enthood also filed in the trial court a motion to certify the defen-
dants as a class and amended their complaint to request that this
class be enjoined from harassing patients and staff, blocking access
to the clinic, and interfering with its operations. 329 In addition,
tenants in the apartment building• next to the clinic intervened as
plaintiffs in the amended complaint, alleging that the picketers
blocked access on the sidewalk in front of the buildings, threatened
people entering or leaving the area, caused traffic hazards, and
screamed so loudly that they could be heard inside the apartments,
thereby invading the tenants' privacy and disrupting their lives.
After conducting a hearing on these new motions, the trial
court found that there had been numerous violations of the initial
3" Id. at 721, 723, 550 N.E.2d at 1373-74 (O'Connor, J., dissenting). Justice O'Connor
stated:
Surely reasonable persons, wishing to express their views about the morality of
abortion and whether abortion should be legal, could not be confident that they
would not violate that injunction by joining others on public ways adjacent to a
clinic to picket, pray, chant, and exhort others to accept their viewpoint.
Id. at 721, 550 N.E.2d at 1373 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
333 52 Ohio St. 3d 56, 59-60, 556 N.E.2d 157, 161-62 (1990).
3" Id. at 57, 556 N.E.2d at 160.
3" Id. at 57-58, 556 N.E.2d at 160.
32a
	 at 58, 556 N.E.2d at 160.
329 Id.
July 1991]	 ANTI-ABORTION PROTESTS
	 887
injunction; that when the tenants had complained to the protestors
about the noise, the picketers had increased their shouting; that the
shouting had a menacing character that instilled fear in others; and
that the "effect of the unrestrained picketing is not the peaceful
presentation of a political or religious opinion, but the attempt to
disrupt a medical operation by force or fear." 33° Concluding that
the protestors conduct constituted a nuisance that the initial in-
junction had not abated, the trial court modified the injunction and
conditionally certified a class action. 33 k
When several defendants were subsequently charged with con-
tempt for violation of the modified injunction, they appealed to a
court of appeals. 332
 The appellate court affirmed the findings of
contempt, but reversed the conditional certification of a defendant
class. 333
 Defendant protestors then appealed, with Planned Parent-
hood filing a cross-appeal, to the Ohio Supreme Court to certify
the record. 334
Addressing the constitutionality of the injunction, the Supreme
Court of Ohio first recognized the first amendment's guarantee of
the right to communicate one's views and express dissension, but
asserted that these rights do not include the right to imperil public
safety or to harass others in the exercise of their rights. 333
 The court
stated that it is not necessary to disrupt the operations of a medical
facility or to block access to facilities in order to express one's
opinions. 336
 The court noted that the first amendment permits rea-
sonable restrictions relating to time, place and manner of expression
as long as they satisfy the requisite tests: they must be content-
neutral, narrowly tailored to serve a significant governmental inter-
est, and allow alternative channels of communication. 337
Scrutinizing the injunction; the court held that because it was
not based on the content or subject matter of speech, it met the
first constitutional requirement of neutrality. 338
 The court then
"0 Id.
" I Id.
332.. Id. at 58-59, 556.N.E.2d at 161.
33' Id.
664
 Id. at 59, 556 N.E.2d at 161.
33, Id. (citing United States v, Dickens, 695 F.2d 765, 772 (3d Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 460
U.S. 1092 (1983): Galella v. Onassis, 353 F. Supp. 196, 223 (S.D.N.Y. 1972), aff'd in part and
rev'd in part, 487 F.2d 986, 999 (2d Cir. 1973)).
"6 Id.
"7 Id. at 59, 556 N.E.2d at 161.
656 Id. at 60, 556 N.E.2d at 162. The court described the injunction in the following
terms:
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noted that the injunction served the significant state interest. in
ensuring that "trade and commerce be conducted. unimpeded by
breaches of the peace and threats to the safety of those engaged in
or patronizing a lawful business."'" Noting that the business in-
volved was the provision of medical treatment,. the court asserted
that courts have uniformly recognized that restrictions. on demon-
strations in front of medical clinics, which meet all constitutional
requirements, serve a legitimate public interest. The "court then
stated that the injunction was not vague or overbroad because it
was specific in its terms and described the acts to be restrained in
reasonable detail. 34° Finally, the court concluded that because:- the
injunction allowed the protestors to express their opinions, picket
within reasonable limits and pass out literature,• it sufficiently pro-
vided alternative channels of communication." 41 Having analyzed
the injunction. in light of the constitutional requirements" on restric-
tions on expression, the court held that the injunction issued, by the
trial court did not violate the first amendment. 3.42
These three recent cases illustrate some of the ways in which
courts are attempting. to grapple with the conflict of rights engen-
dered by anti-abortion protest. In Eanes v. State, .the Court of Ap-
peals of Maryland upheld an ordinance limiting. the volume. of
speech based on a significant state interest in protecting its citizens
from unwelcome noise.343 The ordinance prohibited. Eanes from
expressing his unamplified opinion about a controversial political
and social topic on a public sidewalk in a commercial area, even
though he did not threaten anyone, did not trespass on clinic prop-
.
The injunction before us prohibits screaming, chanting, speaking or singing in
a manner intended to reach or , which had the effect of reaching patients inside
the clinic at 3332 . Vine Street; screaming at patients entering or leaving the
clinic; blocking the driveway, entrances, or 'exits frOm the 'clinic the public
walkway in front of ii; and mass picketing. The court limited the numbers of
picketers to one stationary picket on the Louis Street sidewalk; one stationary'
picket on the Shields Street sidewalk and three moving pickets at designated
locations. Limits were not placed on the numbers'of pickets on the west side of
Vine Street.
•I •Id. at 59-60, 556 N.E.2d at 161-62.
5" Id. at 60, 556 N.E.2d at 162.
54° Id. at 6041, 556 N.E.2d at 162L63.
"' Id. at 60, 556 N.E.2d at 162.
312 Id. In the rest of its decision, the court reversed the Appeals Court on the issue of
the conditional class certification, finding that the trial court did not abuse its disCretion in
certifying•the defendant class action because it met all'the prerequisites of such an action.
Id. at 68, 556 N.E.2d at 168.
345 318 Md. 436, 449, 468, 569 A.2d 604, 610, 620, cert. denied, 110 S. Ct. 3218 (1990).
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erty, did not block access to the facility, and was not found to have
disrupted any medical procedures at the clinic. 544
In Planned Parenthood v. Operation Rescue, the Supreme Judicial
Court of Massachusetts reinstated an injunction prohibiting obstruc-
tion of clinics, citing the state interest in protecting its citizens,
residents, and visitors from irreparable harm that would result from
the denial of the substantive right to abortion, effected by the
obstruction of abortion facilities. 345 The injunction, however, only
enjoined the protestors from obstructing the clinics and committing
acts of force and violence against patients and staff. 346
Finally, in Planned Parenthood v. Project Jericho, the Supreme
Court of Ohio upheld a lower court injunction, based on the state's
interest in ensuring that medical clinics be allowed to conduct their
business of treating patients, unimpeded by breaches of the peace
and threats to safety. 347
 The court stated that it is not necessary to
block access to facilities or disrupt the operations of a medical clinic
in order to express one's opinion, and prescribed only those activ-
ities that do S0. 348
These cases demonstrate the difficulty encountered by courts
in balancing the conflicting rights to abortion and free expression.
More importantly, however, they illustrate how courts following
similar guidelines for constitutional restrictions on free speech can
achieve significantly different results, depending on the state inter-
est upon which the restriction is based.
IV. EXAMINATION OF SIGNIFICANT GOVERNMENT AND STATE
INTERESTS IN THE ANTI-ABORTION PROTEST CASES
Courts addressing restrictions on anti-abortion protest must
ensure that the restrictions are content-neutral, serve a governmen-
tal interest, are narrowly tailored to effect that interest, leave open
alternative avenues of communication, and are not unconstitution-
ally vague. 349
 Because the restriction must be tailored to effect a
significant governmental interest, the interest relied upon by the
court will largely affect the final scope and impact of the restric-
"4 Id. at 472-73, 569 A.2d at 622 (Eldridge, J., dissenting).
"5
 406 Mass. 701, 707, 710, 716, 550 N.E.2d 1361, 1365, 1366 (1990).
34" Id. at 705 n.5, 550 N.E.2d at 1364 n.5.
"7
 52 Ohio St. 3d 56, 60, 556 N.E.2d 157, 162 (1990).
348 Id.
34° See supra notes 86-279 and accompanying text for a discussion of these requirements.
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tion. 350 In examining the numerous cases dealing with anti-abortion
protest, one sees that courts therefore follow essentially the same
standards set for reasonable restrictions on expressive conduct.
They arrive at restrictions, however, that often differ greatly in
their focus and effect as a result of the various interests that courts
have asserted.3"
Courts have been inconsistent in addressing the central inter-
ests implicated by the anti-abortion protest cases. 352 As a result, they
have often based the restrictions on governmental interests that
effectively ignore the essential conflict between the rights to abor-
tion and free speech. 353 Although some courts have astutely bal-
anced the first amendment rights of the protestors against such
compelling state interests as protecting medical facilities from dis-
ruptive and potentially harmful conduct, others have weighed the
free speech rights of the protestors against such inappropriate gov-
ernmental interests as keeping streets and sidewalks free of obstruc-
tion and protecting people from unwelcome noise. 354 In so doing,
courts have effectively diminished the gravity of the interests im-
plicated by the conflict.
In addressing these conflicting constitutional rights, the first
amendment considerations implicated by anti-abortion protest can-
not be understated. The debate over the right to abortion encom-
passes issues of religious conviction, governmental interference,
women's rights, rights of privacy, civil rights, and basic beliefs on
life and death, and demands access to the minds of the nation.
People must be given the opportunity to learn about the ramifica-
tions that may result from the assertion of this right as well as about
the possible consequences of its denial. No other issue in the United
States today perhaps more deserves first amendment protection.
Yet, while the first amendment interests are significant, the rights
implicated by women seeking abortions are equally weighty. The
right to abortion, as conferred upon women in Roe, is a fundamen-
tally private right355 which, absent governmental protection, could
360 See supra notes 117-220 and accompanying text for a discussion of interests courts
have recognized.
351 See supra notes 117-220 and accompanying text.
352 See supra notes 117-220 and accompanying text.
353 See supra notes 119-140 and accompanying text.
3" See supra notes 117-220 and accompanying text.
"' See, e.g., Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113,153 (1973); City of Akron v. Akron Center for
Reproductive Health, 462 U.S. 416,429 (1983); Thornburgh v. American College of Obste-
tricians and Gynecologists, 476 U.S. 747,772 (1986).
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be denied to women by anti-abortion advocates choosing to place
their own moral imperatives above the law.
Although it is true that courts should -avoid constitutional ques-
tions where other grounds are available and dispositive of the issues
presented,"6 courts cannot so avoid the conflict as to do injustice
to the actual interests. For example, when a court tailors an injunc-
tion to a governmental interest in keeping sidewalks open and
available for movement of people and property, such an injunction
only creates a place restriction that keeps the sidewalks in order. It
does nothing to prevent protestors from nonetheless making noise
or engaging in other conduct, which although in line with the place
restriction, substantially interferes with the administration of med-
ical care. Several courts, including the United States Supreme
Court, have recognized that upsetting speech and harassment can-
not be tolerated in a medical environment, as it endangers the
health of the targeted patients."' Promoting an interest in keeping
sidewalks open and available for movement of people and property
for the purposes of the abortion protest cases implies a greater
concern with orderly sidewalks than with the health of the women
involved. Although the interest addresses such activity as the ob-
struction and blockading of facilities, conduct that is already gen-
erally illegal, it does not effectively address the hazardous environ-
ment created by the protestors.
Other interests that the courts have relied upon, such as the
interest in protecting listeners from unwelcome noise, 358 unneces-
sarily restrict expressive conduct because they also fail to address
properly the real interests involved. In Eanes, for example, the court
upheld a statute that had the effect of prohibiting Eanes from
speaking, in an unamplified voice, about a controversial political
and social topic, on a public sidewalk in a commercial area, in the
middle of the day. 359 He was restricted from preaching the gospel
even though there was no evidence that he disrupted the medical
procedures at the clinic. By failing to state a more appropriate
"3 See National Org. for Women v. Operation Rescue, 726 F. Supp. 1483, 1494 (E.D.
Va. 1989), aff 'd, 914 F.2d 582, 584 (4th Cir. 1990), cert. granted sub nom. Bray v. Alexandria
Women's Health Clinic, 111 S. Ct. 1070 (1991).
3" See NLRB v. Baptist Hosp., Inc., 442 U.S. 773, 791 (1979) (Burger, Cj., concurring);
Beth Israel Hosp. v. NLRB, 437 U.S. 483, 505 (1978); American College of Obstetricians
and Gynecologists, Pennsylvania Section v. Thornburgh, 613 F. Supp. 656, 666 (E.D. Pa.
1985).
333 See Eanes v. State, 318 Md. 436, 449, 569 A.2d 604, 610, cert, denied, 110 S. Ct. 3218
(1990),
959 Id. at 472-73, 569 A.2d at 622 (Eldridge, J., dissenting).
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governmental interest, such as an interest in protecting medical
facilities from disruptive conduct, the court unnecessarily restricted
speech on this controversial topic. It also provided an instrument
by which individuals could potentially suppress the expression of
viewpoints with which they disagree under the cloak of annoyance
at its volume.
The most appropriate basis for restriction on expressive con-
duct might ideally be the recognition of a governmental interest in
protecting a woman's right to abortion. 36° Such recognition would
at least compel courts to be straightforward in their balancing of
the implicated interests. The right to an abortion is a fundamentally
private right that, absent governmental protection, could be denied
to women by anti-abortion advocates choosing to place their own
moral imperatives above the law. Most courts have held, however,
that although Roe stands for the proposition that a woman has a
right to terminate her pregnancy free from governmental interfer-
ence, Roe does not compel governmental protection of the right
from private interference. 361 There is strong reasoning, however,
in the Lewis and Bering decisions, cases upholding a significant in-
terest in protecting the right to abortion, which recognized such a
privacy interest would be meaningless if it was protected only from
interference by the state. 362 The Planned Parenthood u. Operation
Rescue case took a similar position when it asserted a governmental
interest in protecting women from the harm of private interference
with the abortion right. 363
These courts rest their decisions on the fundamental right to
abortion as stated in Roe. Yet, the Roe decision remains in danger
of being overturned. justice Rehnquist in Webster asserted his belief
that the Roe trimester framework is a constitutional construction
that has proved "unsound in principle and unworkable in practice,"
hinting that abortion regulation might be better handled by the
states themselves. 364 Given that there is so little support for the
proposition that the right to choose is protected against even private
560 See supra notes 205-220 and accompanying text for a discussion of the interest in
preserving the right to abortion.
MI See New York State Nat'l Org. for Women v. Terry, 886 F.2d 1339, 1358 (2d Cir.
1989); National Org. for Women, 726 F. Supp. at 1493 n.11; Roe v. Operation Rescue, 710 F.
Supp. 577, 582 (E.D. Pa. 1989).
562 See Lewis v. Pearson Found., 908 F.2d 318, 322 (8th Cir. 1990); Bering v, Share, 106
Wash. 2d 212, 229-30, 721 P.2d 918, 929 (1986), cert. dismissed, 479 U.S. 1050 (1987).
m5 See 406 Mass. 701, 709, 710. 550 N.E.2d 1361, 1366 (1990).
364 Webster v. ReprOductive Health Servs., 492 U.S. 490, 521, 518 (1989) (quoting Garcia
v. San Antonio Metro. Transit Auth., 469 U.S. 528, 546 (1985)).
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interference, and further, given that the future of Roe remains
uncertain, courts addressing the anti-abortion conflict should re-
frain from basing restrictions of free speech solely on the right
identified in Roe. Until the United States Supreme Court addresses
the issue of private interference with a woman's fundamental right
to an abortion, thereby giving guidance to the lower courts, courts
would be well advised to rely on an interest that is easier to support
but remains nonetheless compelling, an interest that deals with the
gravity of the interests involved, but which takes the conflict out of
the abortion rhetoric and discusses it in terms of medical services.
One can understand such an interest as the obligation to protect
medical facilities from conduct disrupting the proper provision of
medical care. The anti-abortion protest cases have illustrated that
such protests can have a potentially hazardous effect on the health
of individuals seeking to exercise their right to abortion. 565 For
example, at least one court has noted that women forced to pass
through a hostile crowd to enter a clinic to obtain an abortion suffer
heightened anxiety and feelings of guilt that can affect the medical
procedure and also cause long-term effects on their mental state.' 66
For some women who elect to undergo an abortion, a physician
prescribes and inserts a pre-abortion laminaria to achieve cervical
dilation. 567 In these instances, timely removal of the -laminaria is
necessary to avoid infection.s" Anti-abortion demonstrations can
endanger patients requiring this removal procedure and other nec-
essary medical services, by delaying or denying them the opportu-
nity to receive these services. Other incidents illustrating the hazard
of clinical demonstrations include a patient having to be rushed
from a clinic to a hospital for further medical care only to have the
ambulance obstructed by protestors. 369 Some sources contend that
the complication rate for abortions increases by four to five percent
when protestors are demonstrating outside the clinic. 37° The signif-
icant interest in averting such harm must be upheld by the courts.
365 See infra notes 366-370 and accompanying text.
366 American College of Obstetricians and Gynecologists, Pennsylvania Section v. Thorn-
burgh, 613 F. Supp. 656, 668 (E.D. Pa. 1985).
567
 National Org. for Women v. Operation Rescue, 726 F. Supp. 1483, 1489 (E.D. Va.
1989), al: I'd, 914 F.2d 582, 584 (4th Cir. 1990), cert. granted sub nom Bray v. Alexandria
Women's Health Clinic, 111 S. Ct. 1070 (1991).
368 Id.
369 See Portland Feminist Women's Health Center v. Advocates for Life, 859 F.2d 681,
683 (9th Cir. 1988).
' 7" See Donovan, supra note 68, at 9.
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In addressing abortion protest cases, courts should apply the
same type of analysis as the court did in Portland Feminist Women's
Health Center."' Citing an interest in "protecting the ability of [a]
clinic to provide medical services free from interference that may
endanger the health and safety of its patients," the court narrowly
tailored its injunction -to meet this interest, prohibiting only that
conduct that substantially interfered with medical care. 372 The Port-
land Feminist Women's Health Center court also included a place re-
striction of a "free zone" extending twelve-and-a-half feet to the
right and the left of the front door of the clinic, and from the front
door to the curb, tailored "to address threats, intimidation, and
assault of clinic personnel and clients that impede the safe provision
of medical care."575 Even the dissent in Eanes appeared willing to
adopt the standard set in Portland Feminist Women's Health Center. 574
The dissent there disagreed with the majority's reliance on an in-
terest in protecting individuals from unwelcome noise and implied
that the only possible justification for restricting Eanes' unamplified
speech would have been a showing that his speech disrupted the
provision of medical services, coupled with a stated interest in pre-
venting such disruption. 373
The court in Planned Parenthood v. Project Jericho asserted a
similar interest in ensuring that medical clinics be allowed to con-
duct their business of treating patients, unimpeded by breaches of
the peace and threats to safety that serve to disrupt that business. 576
The injunction's prohibition of noise intended to reach or that had
the effect of reaching patients inside the clinic, of harassment, of
obstruction of access, and of mass picketing does much to proscribe
only that expressive activity that infringes upon the medical treat-
ment of the clinic and endangers the health of the patients. 377
Similarly, in O.B.G.Y.N., where the court noted an interest in
protecting clinics from expressive conduct that hinders medical
treatment and thereby adversely affects the health and welfare of
its patients, the court carefully balanced the competing interests,
"I See 859 F.2d at 686.
972 Id. at 686-87.
"5 Id. at 686.
"' Eanes v. State, 318 Md. 436, 488 n.7, 569 A.2d 604, 629 n.7 (Eldridge, J., dissenting),
cert. denied, 110 S. Ct. 3218 (1990).
'75 Id.
' 7° 52 Ohio St. 3d 56, 60, 556 N.E.2d 157, 162 (1990).
'" Id.
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recognizing their magnitude. 378 The court was careful to modify
the injunction so as to permit protestors to engage in their protected
activity, and only to proscribe expressive conduct that endangered
the health of the clinic patients. 379
By asserting an interest already recognized in several courts,
including the United States Supreme Court, courts will not only
better serve that interest, but they will also be less likely to restrict
expression unnecessarily, as they will not proscribe activity that does
not infringe upon the clinical environment. Protestors would be
able to exercise their rights to free speech up to this limit, at which
point, the interests in disseminating information must be subordi-
nated to interests in safeguarding the health of clinic patients. The
interest in protecting individuals from harm justifies the restrictions
of expression in ways that interests in maintaining orderly sidewalks
and protecting citizens from noise, which appear aimed at prevent-
ing public inconvenience and annoyance, do not. Courts would do
well to remember the foremost importance of free speech in our
society and only prohibit that which has the potential of harming
others. As the Court stated in Terminiello v. Chicago:
a function of free speech under our system of government
is to invite dispute. It may indeed best serve its high pur-
pose when it induces a condition of unrest, creates dissat-
isfaction with conditions as they are, or even stirs people
to anger. Speech is often provocative and challenging. It
may strike at prejudices and preconceptions and have
profound unsettling effects as it presses for acceptance of
an idea. That is why freedom of speech, though not ab-
solute . . . is nevertheless protected against censorship or
punishment, unless shown likely to produce a clear and present
danger of a serious substantive evil that rises far above public
inconvenience, annoyance, or unrest. . . . There is no room
under our Constitution for a more restrictive view. 380
There is also no room for a less restrictive view of the first amend-
ment, for as central as free speech is to the fabric of our society, it
must be restricted when it presents a danger of harm to others.
The stated interest in protecting the clinical environment from
disruptive conduct is consistent with the Supreme Court's restriction
"a 0.B.G.Y.N. Assns v. Birthright of Brooklyn and Queens, Inc., 64 A.D.2d 894, 895,
407 N.Y.S.2d 903, 906 (1978).
"9 Id.
' 80 337 U.S. I, 4 (1948) (emphasis added).
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of conduct incompatible with the normal activity of schools 38 ' and
courts."2 The Supreme Court has recognized the value of environ-
ments conducive to learning and judicial administration, as well as
the importance of tranquil medical environments, as stated in NLRB
v. Beth Israel Hospital. 383 It follows that the Court would therefore
ascribe an even greater importance to the interest in preserving the
ability of a clinic to provide medical services free from interference
that may endanger the health and safety of its patients. In consid-
ering anti-abortion protests, therefore, the courts should base their
restrictions of expressive conduct on the interest in protecting med-
ical facilities from conduct that disrupts the provision of medical
care.
V. CONCLUSION
The conflict of rights presented in the anti-abortion protest
cases is too significant for courts to continue basing their decisions
on governmental interests that essentially ignore this conflict. On
one hand, the right to abortion is a fundamental right that lies at
the core of the individual's right to privacy, yet the United States
Supreme Court has not held that the government must protect this
right from private interference. It has held, however, that states
have a significant interest in protecting medical environments from
interference that could adversely affect the health of patients. Abor-
tion clinics provide medical services, and are therefore entitled to
protection by courts and local ordinances.
On the other hand, the right to free speech is a right that rests
at the core of our democracy. The United States Supreme Court
has interpreted it to include the right to picket peacefully, and to
persuade others to action in public forums. This right cannot be
infringed upon unreasonably, and may be restricted only when the
speech it protects interferes with a significant state or governmental
interest.
Courts have diminished the substantial interests involved in the
rights to abortion and free speech by not directly addressing the
conflict of these rights in the anti-abortion protest context. In as-
serting evasive governmental interests, such as keeping sidewalks
open for movement and protecting individuals from unwelcome
58 ' See Crayned v. City of Rockford, 408 U.S. 104, 121 (1972).
"I See Cox v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 559, 565 (1965).
"5
 See 442 U.S. 773, 791 (1979) (Burger, C.J., concurring).
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noise, as a basis for restricting freedom of expression, courts have
clouded the conflict, and tailored injunctions that have often failed
to protect adequately the real interests of either of the parties
involved. By tailoring injunctions and ruling upon ordinances based
on the significant state interest in preserving the ability of a clinic
to provide medical services free from interference that may endan-
ger the health and safety of its patients, courts would be better able
to balance the interests involved, and would better protect the im-
plicated rights of the involved parties.
LUKE T. CADIGAN
